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games-and-information-in-higher-categories.tex
Source for Games and Information in Higher Categories
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1601 \node[ty] (bc) at (1.1,0) {\small $\{b,c\}$};1602 \node[ty] (de) at (3.3,0) {\small $\{d,e\}$};1603 \draw[thick] (ab)--node[left,lab]{$a$}(a2) (ab)--node[right,lab]{$b$}(bc) (cd)--node[left,lab]{$c$}(bc) (cd)--node[right,lab]{$d$}(de) (e1)--node[right,lab]{$e$}(de);1604 \node[lab] at (-2.4,1.5) {$T_1$}; \node[lab] at (-2.4,0) {$T_2$};1605 \begin{scope}[xshift=7.6cm]1606 \node[ty] (s) at (0,1.5) {\small $s$};1607 \node[ty] (sp) at (1.8,1.5) {\small $s'$};1608 \node[ty] (t) at (0,0) {\small $t$};1609 \node[ty] (tp) at (1.8,0) {\small $t'$};1610 \draw[thick] (s)--(t) (s)--(tp) (sp)--(t) (sp)--(tp);1611 \end{scope}1612\end{tikzpicture}1613\caption{Knowledge graphs for two agents (state-vertices suppressed). Left: five states, partitions1614$\{ab\mid cd\mid e\}$ and $\{a\mid bc\mid de\}$; $B$ is a tree, so no nontrivial event is common knowledge and1615$b_1=0$. Right: the product structure $\Omega=T_1\times T_2$ with two types each; $B$ is a 4-cycle and $b_1=1$.}\label{fig:Bgraph}1616\end{figure}1617 1618\begin{example}\label{ex:product-B}1619For the product structure $\Omega=T_1\times T_2$ with $|T_1|=m$, $|T_2|=n$---independent private types with1620full support, the standard setting of auction theory---$B$ is the complete bipartite graph $K_{m,n}$,1621connected with $b_1=(m-1)(n-1)$. If agent~1 is fully informed ($p_1=\id$), every state is a leaf hanging from a cell of1622agent~2, and $B$ is a disjoint union of stars: $b_1=0$.1623\end{example}1624 1625So $\pi_0$ of the homotopy colimit is common knowledge, and there is a $\pi_1$ about which the classical1626theory of knowledge is silent. That silence is justified: \cref{prop:S5} shows that knowledge operators1627factor through $\Sub$, and subobjects cannot detect loops. The loops become visible as soon as one puts1628something over $B$ that can have monodromy. Probabilistic beliefs are such a thing, and \cref{ch:belief}1629shows that the first cohomology of $B$ is exactly the obstruction to a common prior.1630 1631\section{Many agents: simplicial models}1632 1633For $n$ agents there is a second geometric object in the literature, coming from distributed computing.1634 1635\begin{definition}\Sli[\cite{GLR21,HKR13}]1636The \term{simplicial model} of an information structure is the simplicial complex $\mathcal{C}$ with vertex1637set $\coprod_iT_i$---a vertex is a pair (agent, local state), ``coloured'' by its agent---in which each state1638$\omega$ spans the $(n-1)$-simplex $\{p_1(\omega),\dots,p_n(\omega)\}$.1639\end{definition}1640 1641Two states are indistinguishable to agent $i$ exactly when their simplices share the $i$-coloured vertex,1642and indistinguishable to every member of a coalition $J$ when they share a $J$-coloured face. Goubault,1643Ledent and Rajsbaum \cite{GLR21} show that such complexes correspond to (proper) Kripke models of1644multi-agent S5, and that standard communication protocols act on them by subdivision. The topology1645matters: in the theory of distributed computing \cite{HKR13} a task is solvable only if a certain map of1646complexes exists, and the obstructions are higher connectivity conditions---the impossibility of1647wait-free consensus is the statement that a protocol complex is connected and so cannot be mapped1648compatibly onto a disconnected output complex.1649 1650The graph $B$ and the complex $\mathcal{C}$ are related by a map $B\to\mathcal{C}$ sending each1651state-vertex to the barycentre of its simplex, and they have the same $\pi_0$. They do not have the same1652$\pi_1$. Take three agents and two states that agents~1 and~2 cannot distinguish and agent~3 can: $\mathcal{C}$1653is two triangles glued along an edge, which is contractible, whereas $B$ has a cycle. Both are legitimate1654invariants: $B$ is the homotopy colimit of the type maps and controls gluing problems for data attached to1655individual agents; $\mathcal{C}$ additionally fills in what coalitions distributedly know. Which higher1656invariants of $\mathcal{C}$ are game-theoretically meaningful is, as far as we know, open1657(\cref{ch:coda}).1658 1659\section{Knowledge and time}1660 1661In an extensive game with perfect recall, each player's information refines as play proceeds: by1662\cref{prop:recall} her information sets form a forest, and the map from plays to her information at her1663$n$-th move is a tower of quotients $\Omega\to\cdots\to T_i^{(n+1)}\to T_i^{(n)}$---classically, a filtration. Each stage has its own1664knowledge operator $\K_i^{(n)}$ and these increase with $n$. The object underlying the tower is a1665presheaf on $\omega$, that is, an information structure \emph{in the topos of trees}; the internal1666knowledge modality of that topos packages all the $\K_i^{(n)}$ at once. We shall not need this internal1667formulation in detail, but it explains why the temporal modality of \cref{ch:perfection,ch:repetition} and1668the epistemic modality of this chapter have the same algebraic form: both are $p^*\forall_p$ for a suitable1669map $p$.1670 1671\section*{Notes}1672 1673The partition model and the characterization of common knowledge by the meet are due to Aumann1674\cite{Aum76}; the notion itself is usually credited to Lewis. The fixed-point formulation is standard in1675epistemic logic. Quantifiers as adjoints are due to Lawvere; the systematic reading of modal operators as1676base-change (co)monads in dependent type theory is expounded in \cite{Cor20}, and modalities in homotopy type1677theory are studied in \cite{RSS20}. The identification of the homotopy colimit of a diagram of sets with1678the nerve of its category of elements is a special case of Thomason's theorem \cite{Tho79}. Simplicial1679models for epistemic logic are due to Goubault, Ledent and Rajsbaum \cite{GLR21}, building on the1680topological theory of distributed computing \cite{HKR13}. The approximation of common knowledge by common1681$p$-belief, which matters when knowledge is replaced by high-probability belief, is taken up in1682\cref{ch:dynamic}.1683 1684\section*{Exercises}1685 1686\begin{exercise}1687Let $p\colon\Omega\to T$ be a function that is not surjective. Which clauses of \cref{prop:S5} survive?1688\end{exercise}1689\begin{exercise}1690Show directly from the adjunctions that $\K_i\K_j$ need not equal $\K_j\K_i$, and that1691$\CK E\subseteq\K_{i_1}\cdots\K_{i_m}E$ for every finite sequence of agents.1692\end{exercise}1693\begin{exercise}1694For the information structure on the left of \cref{fig:Bgraph}, compute $\K_1E$, $\K_2E$, $\K_1\K_2E$ and1695$\CK E$ for $E=\{a,b,c,d\}$. At which states does everyone know $E$ without $E$ being common knowledge?1696\end{exercise}1697\begin{exercise}1698Verify the formula for $b_1(B)$ in \cref{prop:hocolim} on both graphs of \cref{fig:Bgraph}, and prove1699\cref{ex:product-B}.1700\end{exercise}