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games-and-information-in-higher-categories.tex

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1221 1222\begin{theorem}[Kuhn]\label{thm:kuhn}\Scl[\cite{Kuh53}]1223If player $i$ has perfect recall, then for every mixed strategy of $i$ there is a behavioural strategy1224inducing the same distribution over terminal nodes against every profile of the other players, and1225conversely.1226\end{theorem}1227 1228\begin{proof}[Proof sketch, via realization plans \cite{vS96}]1229By \cref{prop:recall} the information sets and actions of $i$ form a labelled forest; call a path from a1230root a \emph{sequence} of $i$. A \emph{realization plan} is a function $r$ on sequences with $r(\emptyset)=1$ and1231$\sum_{a\in A(I)}r(\varsigma_Ia)=r(\varsigma_I)$, where $\varsigma_I$ is the unique sequence leading to $I$. The1232probability of a terminal node is the product over players of the realization probabilities of the sequences1233leading to it, times Nature's probabilities; so outcomes depend on a strategy only through its realization plan. A1234mixed strategy $\mu$ has plan $r_\mu(\varsigma)=\mu\{s\st s\text{ agrees with }\varsigma\}$; a behavioural strategy1235$\beta$ has plan $r_\beta(\varsigma)=\prod_{(I,a)\in\varsigma}\beta_I(a)$; and from any plan one recovers a1236behavioural strategy by $\beta_I(a)=r(\varsigma_Ia)/r(\varsigma_I)$ wherever the denominator is positive.1237\end{proof}1238 1239\begin{remark}[The monad-theoretic content]\label{rem:kuhn-monad}1240The distribution monad $\Dist$ is monoidal: there is a natural map1241\[ \nabla\colon\prod_I\Dist A(I)\longrightarrow\Dist\Bigl(\prod_IA(I)\Bigr) \]1242forming product measures. It is not surjective---its image is the independent distributions---and this1243failure is what correlation \emph{is} (\cref{ch:mixing}). Kuhn's theorem says that when information is a tree,1244the outcome map cannot see the difference: it factors through realization plans, on which $\nabla$ becomes1245surjective. The reason is that a single play visits the information sets of $i$ along one \emph{chain} of her1246forest, so correlation between choices at incomparable information sets is never observed. Without perfect1247recall the same play can meet two information sets whose joint behaviour matters, and the theorem fails.1248\end{remark}1249 1250\begin{example}[Forgetting]1251A single player chooses $L$ or $R$, forgets which, and then chooses $l$ or $r$ at one information set1252containing both resulting nodes. The mixed strategy $\tfrac12(L,l)+\tfrac12(R,r)$ reaches the terminal nodes $Ll$ and1253$Rr$ with probability $\tfrac12$ each. A behavioural strategy randomizes independently at the two1254information sets, so it cannot give positive probability to both $Ll$ and $Rr$ without giving positive1255probability to $Lr$ or $Rl$.1256\end{example}1257 1258\section{When are two trees the same game?}\label{sec:thompson}1259 1260\Cref{def:efg} defines a type $\EFG$ of structures, and as in \cref{lem:identity} its identity type is1261isomorphism of labelled trees. Nobody believes that this is the right notion of sameness for all purposes.1262Whether Nature's move is drawn before or after a simultaneous move of the players, whether two successive1263choices of one player are drawn as one node with four branches or two nodes with two branches each---these1264are conventions of drawing. Thompson made the point precise.1265 1266\begin{theorem}[Thompson; Elmes--Reny]\label{thm:thompson}\Scl[\cite{Tho52,ER94}]1267Two finite extensive games have the same reduced strategic form, up to isomorphism, if and only if one can1268be obtained from the other by a finite sequence of four elementary transformations and their inverses:1269\emph{interchange} of two consecutive moves made in ignorance of each other; \emph{coalescing} of two consecutive1270moves of the same player into one; \emph{addition of a superfluous move}; and \emph{inflation--deflation} of information1271sets. Among games with perfect recall, the first three (suitably formulated) suffice and preserve perfect1272recall.1273\end{theorem}1274 1275Here the \emph{reduced} strategic form identifies pure strategies of a player that yield the same payoffs1276against everything. In the language of \cref{ch:rules} the theorem computes a quotient. There is a map1277\[ \EFG\longrightarrow\NFG_u,\qquad \Gamma\mapsto\text{reduced strategic form}, \]1278and its fibres are the classes of the equivalence relation generated by the Thompson moves. Let $\EFG_{\mathrm{T}}$1279be the type obtained from $\EFG$ by adjoining a path for each Thompson move---a higher inductive type, or1280classically the quotient. Then, by \cref{prin:invariance}:1281 1282\begin{quote}1283\emph{A solution concept on $\EFG_{\mathrm{T}}$ is a solution concept on $\EFG$ that is constant along Thompson1284moves; equivalently, one that depends only on the reduced strategic form.}1285\end{quote}1286 1287\noindent This is the \emph{invariance} requirement of Kohlberg and Mertens \cite{KM86}. The next example,1288which is theirs in spirit, shows that it has teeth.1289 1290\begin{example}[Coalescing destroys subgames]\label{ex:outside}1291In the game $\Gamma$ on the left of \cref{fig:outside}, player~1 first chooses between an outside option1292\emph{Out}, worth $(2,2)$, and \emph{In}; after \emph{In} the two players play a simultaneous game in which1293$(T,L)$ pays $(3,1)$, $(B,R)$ pays $(1,3)$, and miscoordination pays $(0,0)$. In $\Gamma'$ on the right,1294player~1's two successive choices have been coalesced into one choice among \emph{Out}, $T$, $B$. The two1295trees have the same reduced strategic form:1296\[1297\begin{array}{c|cc}1298 & L & R\\\hline1299\mathit{Out} & 2,2 & 2,2\\1300T & 3,1 & 0,0\\1301B & 0,0 & 1,31302\end{array}1303\]1304Its Nash equilibria are $(T,L)$ and the profiles in which player~1 plays \emph{Out} and player~2 plays $L$1305with probability $q\le\tfrac23$. In $\Gamma$ the simultaneous game after \emph{In} is a proper subgame, with1306three equilibria: $(T,L)$, $(B,R)$, and a mixed one in which player~1 plays $T$ with probability $\tfrac34$ and1307player~2 plays $L$ with probability $\tfrac14$, worth $\tfrac34$ to player~1. A subgame perfect equilibrium1308(\cref{ch:perfection}) must induce one of these, so the subgame perfect equilibria of $\Gamma$ are $(\mathit{In},T;L)$ and1309\emph{Out} followed by $q\in\{0,\tfrac14\}$. In $\Gamma'$ there is no proper subgame, and every Nash equilibrium is subgame1310perfect, including \emph{Out} with $q=\tfrac12$. The set of subgame perfect equilibria is not constant along a1311coalescing move.1312\end{example}1313 1314\begin{figure}[ht]\centering1315\begin{tikzpicture}[x=1cm,y=1cm]1316  % Gamma1317  \node[dec,label=above:{\small 1}] (r) at (0,0) {};1318  \node[leaf] (o) at (-1.4,-1.2) {$(2,2)$};1319  \node[dec,label=right:{\small 1}] (i) at (1.1,-1.2) {};1320  \node[dec] (t) at (0.1,-2.4) {};