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777 778For Rock--Paper--Scissors this gives the family of closed orbits around the centre. \chk{R4}779 780\begin{proposition}[Generalized Rock--Paper--Scissors]\label{prop:grps}781\Scl[\cite{Zee80}] Let a win pay $a>0$ and a loss $-b<0$. The linearization of \eqref{eq:rep} at the uniform782state has eigenvalues783\[ \lambda_\pm=\frac{b-a}{6}\pm i\,\frac{\sqrt3\,(a+b)}{6}. \]784The centre is asymptotically stable and an ESS for $a>b$, a centre for $a=b$, and a repeller for $a<b$, when785interior orbits approach the boundary. \chk{R5, R6}786\end{proposition}787 788\noindent The cases $a>b$ and $a<b$ are the source's ``good'' and ``bad'' versions. By \Cref{cor:three}(c) the789uniform state is a rest point for every $a,b$, being the fixed point of the $\Z/3$ of symmetries. For three790strategies the possible phase portraits were classified by Zeeman and by Bomze \cite{Zee80,Bom83}; they are791assembled from rest points and cycles. With four strategies the state space is three-dimensional and792chaotic attractors occur \cite{ASS80}; the source illustrates one \src{\S3.2.5}. Two statements survive chaos.793 794\begin{theorem}\label{thm:average}795\Scl[\cite{HoSi98}] If a solution of \eqref{eq:rep} stays at a positive distance from the boundary, then every796limit point of its time averages $\frac1T\int_0^Tx(t)\,dt$ is an interior equilibrium. If the interior797equilibrium is unique, the time averages converge to it.798\end{theorem}799 800\noindent The second surviving statement is the index theorem of the next chapter.801 802\section*{Notes}803 804The replicator equation was introduced in \cite{TaJo78} and named in \cite{ScSi83}. The standard reference is805\cite{HoSi98}; \cite{San10} treats it within a general theory of population dynamics. \Cref{thm:gradient} is in806\cite{Sha79,Aki79}. The functorial statement \Cref{thm:natural} is elementary and its three cases are807classical; we have not found it stated as a single naturality property. Relative entropy as a Lyapunov808function, and the reading of the replicator equation as an information-geometric flow, are developed in809\cite{BaPo16,Har09}. The equivalence of the replicator equation on $n$ strategies with a Lotka--Volterra810system in $n-1$ variables is due to Hofbauer \cite{Hof81}.811 812\section*{Exercises}813 814\begin{exercise}\label{exer:two}815Derive \eqref{eq:two} and the escape-time formula for the drift game.816\end{exercise}817 818\begin{exercise}\label{exer:fisher}819Prove the formula for $\frac{d}{dt}x^{\T}Ax$ in \Cref{thm:gradient}, and show that for general $A$ the rate is820$2\operatorname{Cov}_x(Sx,Ax)$, where $S=\tfrac12(A+A^{\T})$.821\end{exercise}822 823\begin{exercise}\label{exer:eig}824Verify \Cref{prop:grps} by computing the trace and determinant of the linearization on the tangent space.825\end{exercise}826 827\begin{exercise}\label{exer:lump}828A population plays Rock--Paper--Scissors with Rock present in two indistinguishable variants, in initial829state $(\tfrac14,\tfrac14,\tfrac14,\tfrac14)$. Describe the motion of the class frequencies.830\end{exercise}831%% ---- end ch/03-replicator.tex ----832%% ---- begin ch/04-index.tex ----833\chapter{Index, Recurrence, and Decomposition}\label{ch:index}834 835Three questions cannot be answered one equilibrium at a time. How many equilibria can there be, and of what836kinds? What replaces an equilibrium when the dynamics cycles? Which part of a game is responsible for the837cycling? Each has an answer in which topology does the work.838 839\section{The index theorem}840 841Write $F_A$ for the replicator field. At a rest point $x$ its derivative preserves the tangent space842$T=\{v:\sum_sv_s=0\}$ of the simplex.843 844\begin{definition}845A game is \term{regular} if every Nash equilibrium is quasi-strict and $D_xF_A|_T$ is invertible at each. The846\term{index} of a Nash equilibrium $x$ of a regular game is847\[ \operatorname{ind}(x)=\operatorname{sign}\det\bigl(-D_xF_A|_T\bigr)\in\{+1,-1\}. \]848\end{definition}849 850\noindent Regular games are open and dense among all games. An equilibrium at which every eigenvalue of851$D_xF_A|_T$ has negative real part has index $+1$.852 853\begin{theorem}[Index theorem]\label{thm:index}854\Scl[Hofbauer and Sigmund; Poincar\'e--Hopf] For a regular game,855\[ \sum_{x\ \mathrm{Nash}}\operatorname{ind}(x)=1 . \]856\end{theorem}857\begin{proof}[Sketch]858For small $\epsilon>0$ the field $F_A(x)+\epsilon(u-x)$, with $u$ the uniform state, points strictly inward859on the boundary of the simplex. Its rest points converge, as $\epsilon\to0$, to the rest points of $F_A$ that860are \emph{saturated}, that is, to the Nash equilibria: a rest point with a strategy outside its support that861earns more than average is pushed out of the simplex and disappears. Regularity makes the correspondence a862bijection that preserves the sign of the determinant. The negative of an inward-pointing field points outward,863and by the Poincar\'e--Hopf theorem the sum of the indices of its zeros is the Euler characteristic of the864simplex, which is $1$ because the simplex is contractible; see \DT{Ch.~7} for the three descriptions of865the Euler characteristic used here.866\end{proof}867 868The theorem is checked on four hundred random games with three and four strategies. \chk{I1}869 870\begin{corollary}\label{cor:index}871In a regular game: (a) the number of Nash equilibria is odd; (b) every ESS has index $+1$ \chk{I2}; (c) if872there are $k$ equilibria of index $+1$ there are exactly $k-1$ of index $-1$; in particular two ESS force a873third equilibrium, which is not stable. \chk{I3}874\end{corollary}875 876\noindent In the coordination game $\begin{psmallmatrix}2&0\\0&1\end{psmallmatrix}$ the two conventions have