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evolutionary-game-theory-in-higher-categories.tex
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621In the game $\begin{psmallmatrix}1&100\\0&100\end{psmallmatrix}$ of the source's discussion of weak dominance,622compute $\Q_x$ for each pure strategy $x$ and decide which is an ESS.623\end{exercise}624%% ---- end ch/02-stability.tex ----625\part{Dynamics}626%% ---- begin ch/03-replicator.tex ----627\chapter{The Replicator Equation}\label{ch:replicator}628 629\section{Derivation as a quotient}630 631Let $n_s(t)>0$ be the number of individuals using strategy $s$, and suppose each type grows at a per-capita632rate equal to its payoff against the current population: $\dot n_s=n_s\,f_s(x)$ with $x=n/|n|$, $|n|=\sum_sn_s$,633$f(x)=Ax$. Differentiating $x_s=n_s/|n|$ gives the \term{replicator equation} \cite{TaJo78}634\begin{equation}\label{eq:rep}635\dot x_s=x_s\bigl((Ax)_s-x^{\T}Ax\bigr),\qquad s\in S .636\end{equation}637 638\begin{proposition}\label{prop:quotient}639\Srf[\cite{HoSi98}] The growth system on the open cone $\R^S_{>0}$ is invariant under the scaling action of640$\R_{>0}$ up to a change of speed along orbits, and \eqref{eq:rep} is the vector field it induces on the641quotient $\R^S_{>0}/\R_{>0}\iso\operatorname{int}\Dist(S)$. The field extends smoothly to the closed simplex.642\end{proposition}643 644\noindent The source derives \eqref{eq:rep} twice, from births and deaths and from imitation \src{\S3.2.1--3.2.2}. The645first is \Cref{prop:quotient}; the second is \Cref{ch:protocols}. We write $\Rep(S,A)$ for the dynamical system646on $\Dist(S)$ defined by \eqref{eq:rep}, and $\Dyn$ for the category whose objects are compact spaces with a647continuous flow and whose morphisms are continuous maps commuting with the flows.648 649\section{Naturality}650 651\begin{theorem}[The replicator equation is a functor]\label{thm:natural}652\Sob If $f\colon(S,A)\to(T,B)$ is payoff-preserving, then $f_*\colon\Dist(S)\to\Dist(T)$ maps solutions of653$\Rep(S,A)$ to solutions of $\Rep(T,B)$. Hence $\Rep\colon\Game\to\Dyn$ is a functor.654\end{theorem}655\begin{proof}656Let $x(t)$ solve \eqref{eq:rep} for $A$ and put $y=f_*x$. By \Cref{prop:push}, $(Ax)_s=(By)_{f(s)}$ and657$x^{\T}Ax=y^{\T}By$. Therefore658\[ \dot y_t=\sum_{f(s)=t}x_s\bigl((Ax)_s-x^{\T}Ax\bigr)=\Bigl(\sum_{f(s)=t}x_s\Bigr)\bigl((By)_t-y^{\T}By\bigr)659=y_t\bigl((By)_t-y^{\T}By\bigr) \]660for $t$ in the image of $f$, and $y_t=0$ identically otherwise, which also solves the equation.661\end{proof}662 663Three familiar facts are the three generating cases of \Cref{def:map}. \chk{R1}664 665\begin{corollary}\label{cor:three}666\begin{enumerate}[label=(\alph*)]667\item \emph{Faces are invariant.} For every $S'\subseteq S$ the face $\Dist(S')$ is invariant, and the flow on668it is the replicator flow of the subgame. In particular strategies absent initially stay absent.669\item \emph{Clones lump.} If strategies are duplicated, the total frequency of each class of duplicates670follows the replicator equation of the game without duplicates.671\item \emph{Symmetries act.} The group of symmetries of $(S,A)$ acts on $\Dist(S)$ by automorphisms of the flow;672the fixed-point set of every subgroup is invariant.673\end{enumerate}674\end{corollary}675 676On the side of payoffs, \eqref{eq:rep} depends only on differences $(Ax)_s-(Ax)_{s'}$, so:677 678\begin{proposition}\label{prop:shift}679\Scl A column shift does not change the replicator field, and a rescaling $A\mapsto\lambda A$ multiplies it by680$\lambda$. The functor $\Rep$ factors through games modulo column shifts.681\end{proposition}682 683\section{Two strategies}684 685By \Cref{prop:shift} a two-strategy game may be taken to be $\begin{psmallmatrix}0&a\\b&0\end{psmallmatrix}$. With686$x$ the frequency of the first strategy, \eqref{eq:rep} reads687\begin{equation}\label{eq:two}688\dot x=x(1-x)\bigl(a-(a+b)x\bigr).689\end{equation}690 691\begin{center}\small692\begin{tabular}{@{}llll@{}}693\toprule694signs of $(a,b)$ & in the source & rest points & behaviour\\695\midrule696$a>0>b$ or $b>0>a$ & Prisoner's Dilemma & $0,1$ & one strategy wins\\697$a,b>0$ & Hawk--Dove & $0,1,\frac{a}{a+b}$ & interior attracts\\698$a,b<0$ & coordination & $0,1,\frac{a}{a+b}$ & interior repels\\699$a=b=0$ & ``game of life'' & every point & nothing moves\\700\bottomrule701\end{tabular}702\end{center}703 704\noindent The drift game of \Cref{ch:stability} is the boundary case $a=0>b$:705there $\dot x=x^2(1-x)$ for the invading strategy, and the invader's frequency passes from $x_0$ to $x_1$ in706time707\[ \frac1{x_0}-\frac1{x_1}+\log\frac{x_1(1-x_0)}{x_0(1-x_1)} . \]708An invader that is merely not selected against escapes in time of order $1/x_0$; one that is selected for709escapes in time of order $\log(1/x_0)$. From $x_0=0.05$ to $\tfrac12$ the drift game takes time $20.94$.710\chk{S4}711 712\section{Geometry: gradients and entropy}713 714The \term{Shahshahani metric} on the open simplex is $g_x(u,v)=\sum_su_sv_s/x_s$ for tangent vectors $u,v$715(vectors with $\sum_su_s=0$). It is the Fisher information metric of statistics.716 717\begin{theorem}\label{thm:gradient}718\Scl[Shahshahani 1979; Kimura 1958] If $A$ is symmetric, \eqref{eq:rep} is the gradient flow of719$\tfrac12x^{\T}Ax$ for the Shahshahani metric, and mean payoff increases at the rate720\[ \frac{d}{dt}\,x^{\T}Ax=2\operatorname{Var}_x(Ax)=2\sum_sx_s\bigl((Ax)_s-x^{\T}Ax\bigr)^2 . \]