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177\newcommand{\RP}{\mathbb{RP}}178\newcommand{\CP}{\mathbb{CP}}179\newcommand{\C}{\mathbb{C}}180\newcommand{\trans}{\pitchfork}181\newcommand{\pt}{\mathrm{pt}}182\newcommand{\loss}{\mathcal{L}}183 184% ---------- tikz styles ----------185\tikzset{186  ogbox/.style={draw, thick, rounded corners=2pt, minimum width=1.25cm, minimum height=1.05cm, fill=black!4},187  fw/.style={-{Stealth[length=5pt]}, thick, fwd},188  bw/.style={-{Stealth[length=5pt]}, thick, bwd, densely dashed},189  dec/.style={circle, fill, inner sep=1.7pt},190  nat/.style={circle, draw, thick, fill=white, inner sep=1.7pt},191  leaf/.style={inner sep=2pt, font=\small},192  lab/.style={font=\small, inner sep=1.5pt},193  infoset/.style={densely dashed, thick, accent},194  st/.style={circle, draw, thick, fill=white, inner sep=1.6pt},195  ty/.style={rectangle, draw, thick, fill=black!8, inner sep=2.6pt},196}197\newcommand{\sol}[1]{\par\medskip\noindent\textbf{#1.}\enspace\ignorespaces}198\newcommand{\bookauthor}{Anonymous}199\newcommand{\DT}[1]{\cite[#1]{DTHC}}200\newcommand{\pay}[2]{\pi(#1\mid #2)}201\renewcommand{\Game}{\cat{Game}}202\newcommand{\Rep}{\mathrm{Rep}}203\providecommand{\Q}{Q}\renewcommand{\Q}{Q}204\providecommand{\one}{\mathbf{1}}\renewcommand{\one}{\mathbf{1}}205\providecommand{\T}{\mathsf{T}}\renewcommand{\T}{\mathsf{T}}206\newcommand{\chk}[1]{{\footnotesize\sffamily\upshape\color{accent}[#1]}}207\newcommand{\src}[1]{{\footnotesize\sffamily\upshape\color{ink2}[source, #1]}}208\providecommand{\ev}{\mathrm{ev}}209%% ---- end preamble.tex ----210\begin{document}211\frontmatter212%% ---- begin front.tex ----213\begin{titlepage}214\thispagestyle{empty}215\vspace*{1.1in}216\noindent{\Large\scshape\color{accent} Higher Categorical Semantics}\par217\vspace{0.9in}218\noindent{\fontsize{28}{36}\selectfont\bfseries\raggedright Evolutionary Game\\ Theory in Higher\\ Categories\par}219\vspace{0.35in}220\noindent{\Large\itshape Stability, replicators, recurrence,\\[2pt] finite populations and local interaction}\par221\vfill222\noindent\begin{tikzpicture}[x=1cm,y=1cm]223  \coordinate (R) at (0,0); \coordinate (P) at (3.2,0); \coordinate (S) at (1.6,2.77);224  \draw[black,thick] (R) -- (P) -- (S) -- cycle;225  \fill[accent] (1.6,0.92) circle (1.6pt);226  \draw[fw] (1.6,0.92) ++(0:0.55) arc (0:300:0.55);227  \draw[fw] (1.6,0.92) ++(20:0.95) arc (20:310:0.95);228  \node[lab] at (-0.25,-0.2) {$R$}; \node[lab] at (3.45,-0.2) {$P$}; \node[lab] at (1.6,3.0) {$S$};229  \node[lab] at (4.6,1.3) {$\longmapsto$};230  \node[ogbox] (G) at (6.6,1.3) {$\Rep$};231  \node[lab] at (8.6,1.3) {$\Game\to\Dyn$};232\end{tikzpicture}\par233\vspace{0.5in}234\noindent{\large \bookauthor}\par235\vspace{4pt}236\noindent{\small 2026}237\end{titlepage}238 239\thispagestyle{empty}240\vspace*{\fill}241\noindent{\small242Version 1.0, 17 November 2026.\par\medskip243\noindent This volume is a treatment, in categorical language, of the material surveyed in J.~McKenzie Alexander,244\emph{Evolutionary Game Theory} (Cambridge Elements in Decision Theory and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press,2452023). It reproduces none of that book's text, figures or tables; where a numerical example of the source is246recomputed, this is said. An appendix gives a section-level concordance.\par\medskip247\noindent Every numbered statement carries a status tag: \Scl a classical result; \Sli[source] a result of the cited248literature; \Srf[source] a known result restated in the language of this volume; \Sob an observation of this volume,249proved here; \Spg a proposal. Tags of the form \chk{R4} name a check in the companion script250\texttt{verify-evolutionary-games.py}; tags of the form \src{Thm.~6} point to the source.\par\medskip251\noindent This book was drafted with the assistance of an AI system (Anthropic's Claude), which also wrote and ran the252companion script. The bibliography was assembled from memory and should be checked before it is relied on.}253\clearpage254 255\chapter*{Preface}256 257Evolutionary game theory replaces the rational player of classical game theory by a population. Strategies are258inherited or imitated, payoffs are rates of reproduction or adoption, and the questions change from ``what should259one do?'' to ``what persists?''. Alexander's Element \cite{Alex23} is a compact map of the subject: the static260theory of evolutionarily stable strategies and its set-valued refinements; the replicator equation and its261relatives; finite populations; and models in which interaction is local. It is written for philosophers, and it262is candid about where the models are fragile.263 264This volume retells that material with one question in mind: which of the constructions are \emph{natural}, in265the technical sense that they commute with the evident maps between games? The answers organize the subject266more sharply than we expected.267 268\begin{itemize}[leftmargin=1.4em]269\item The replicator equation is a functor from games and payoff-preserving maps to dynamical systems270(\Cref{thm:natural}). Invariance of faces, the lumping of duplicate strategies, and the action of symmetries271are three instances of one statement.272\item Evolutionary stability of a \emph{point} is not preserved by pulling back along a map that duplicates273strategies; evolutionary stability of a \emph{set} is (\Cref{thm:esset}). The set-valued refinements that the274source surveys are what the point-valued notion is forced to become.275\item The equilibria of a regular game carry indices that sum to one, the Euler characteristic of the simplex276(\Cref{thm:index}); behind the number is a homotopy type, the Conley index, and behind recurrent behaviour a