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evolutionary-game-theory-in-higher-categories.tex

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1881 1882\sol{3.4} By \Cref{cor:three}(b) the class frequencies follow the replicator equation of Rock--Paper--Scissors1883from the initial state $(\tfrac12,\tfrac14,\tfrac14)$. By \Cref{thm:zerosum} they move on the closed curve1884on which the relative entropy to the centre is constant, equivalently on which the product of the three1885frequencies equals $\tfrac1{32}$. The two variants of Rock keep equal shares.1886 1887\section*{Chapter 4}1888 1889\sol{4.1} Let $F(x)=x(1-x)\bigl(a-(a+b)x\bigr)$; the index at an equilibrium is the sign of $-F'$. For $a>0>b$ the1890only equilibrium is $x=1$, with $F'(1)=b<0$: index $+1$. For $a,b>0$ the only equilibrium is1891$x^*=a/(a+b)$, with $F'(x^*)=-(a+b)x^*(1-x^*)<0$: index $+1$. For $a,b<0$ the equilibria are $0$, $1$ and $x^*$,1892with $F'(0)=a<0$, $F'(1)=b<0$ and $F'(x^*)>0$: indices $+1,+1,-1$. The sum is $1$ in each case.1893 1894\sol{4.2} A gradient has zero curl on every triangle. Conversely, if the curl vanishes on triangles through1895the vertex $0$, put $r_i=K_{i0}$. Then $K_{ij}+K_{j0}+K_{0i}=0$ gives $K_{ij}=K_{i0}-K_{j0}=r_i-r_j$.1896 1897\sol{4.3} The row means are $r=\bigl(\tfrac{1+t}3,0,-\tfrac{1+t}3\bigr)$, so $G_{12}=G_{23}=\tfrac{1+t}3$,1898$G_{13}=\tfrac{2(1+t)}3$, and $C_{12}=C_{23}=\tfrac{2-t}3$, $C_{13}=-\tfrac{2-t}3$. The curl is $2-t$, and1899\[ \tau=\frac{2(1+t)^2}{3(2+t^2)} . \]1900It equals $1$ at $t=2$, where the game is a rating difference, and $0$ at $t=-1$, which is1901Rock--Paper--Scissors.1902 1903\sol{4.4} Dove invades Hawk, since $0>(V-C)/2$, and Hawk invades Dove, since $V>V/2$. The graph is a1904two-cycle and its only sink component is the whole of it. This records correctly that neither pure state1905persists, and it misses the outcome: the flow converges to the mixed state, which is not a vertex.1906 1907\section*{Chapter 5}1908 1909\sol{5.1} $\dot x_i=\sum_jx_jx_i(K-\pi_j)-x_i(K-\pi_i)\sum_jx_j=x_i(K-\bar\pi)-x_i(K-\pi_i)=x_i(\pi_i-\bar\pi)$.1910 1911\sol{5.2} At a Nash equilibrium no strategy earns more than the mean, so $k=0$ and the field vanishes.1912Conversely, let $\dot x=0$ and suppose $\kappa=\sum_jk_j>0$. Then $x_i=k_i/\kappa$ for all $i$, so the support of1913$x$ consists of strategies earning strictly more than the mean, which contradicts1914$\sum_ix_i(\pi_i-\bar\pi)=0$. Hence $k=0$, which is the equilibrium condition.1915 1916\sol{5.3} Let $z(t)=\log x(0)+\int_0^t\pi$ and $x=\operatorname{softmax}(z)$. Then1917$\frac d{dt}\log x_i=\pi_i-\frac d{dt}\log\sum_je^{z_j}=\pi_i-\sum_jx_j\pi_j$.1918 1919\sol{5.4} Row's two strategies earn $2y$ and $1-y$; Column's earn $x$ and $2(1-x)$. Hence1920$\dot x=x(1-x)(3y-1)$ and $\dot y=y(1-y)(3x-2)$. At $(\tfrac23,\tfrac13)$ the Jacobian has zero diagonal and both1921off-diagonal entries equal to $3\cdot\tfrac29=\tfrac23$; its eigenvalues are $\pm\tfrac23$.1922 1923\section*{Chapter 6}1924 1925\sol{6.1} With equal fitnesses the number of $A$-players is a bounded martingale, so its expectation at1926absorption equals its initial value: $N\rho=1$. Alternatively, each of the $N$ initial individuals is equally1927likely to be the ancestor of the final population.1928 1929\sol{6.2} Here $g_i/f_i=r^{-1}$ for every $i$, and1930$1+\sum_{k=1}^{N-1}r^{-k}=(1-r^{-N})/(1-r^{-1})$.1931 1932\sol{6.3} Dividing by $N$ and letting $N\to\infty$ gives $a+2b>c+2d$, that is, $a-c>2(d-b)$. With $a>c$ and $d>b$1933this is $x^*=(d-b)/\bigl((a-c)+(d-b)\bigr)<\tfrac13$.1934 1935\sol{6.4} With $i$ cooperators,1936$\frac{g_i}{f_i}=\frac{4i+2(N-i-1)}{3(i-1)+(N-i)}=\frac{2i+2N-2}{2i+N-3}$, which decreases in $i$ and at $i=N-1$1937equals $\frac{4N-4}{3N-5}>\tfrac43$. The last term of the sum in \Cref{thm:fix} alone exceeds $(4/3)^{N-1}$.1938 1939\section*{Chapter 7}1940 1941\sol{7.1} The neighbours $i\pm1$ of $i$ go to $(i\pm1)\bmod n$, which are distinct and are the neighbours of1942$i\bmod n$ when $n\ge3$. For $n=2$ they coincide, and $C_2$ is in any case a single edge.1943 1944\sol{7.2} The condition is $\sigma(i+3)=c(\sigma(i))$ for all $i$. The values at $0,1,2$ are free and determine the1945rest consistently, because $c^3$ is the identity: $27$ configurations. Each orbit $\{i,i+3,i+6\}$ of the1946rotation carries $a$, $c(a)$, $c^2(a)$, so each strategy occurs once per orbit and three times in all. In1947$RPS\,RPS\,RPS$ every player beats one neighbour and loses to the other, all scores are $0$, and under the tie1948rule nobody changes. It satisfies $\sigma(i+3)=\sigma(i)\ne c(\sigma(i))$ and so is not among the $27$.1949 1950\sol{7.3} Number the cooperators $1,2,\dots$ and the defectors $0,-1,\dots$ from the boundary. The scores are1951$u_1=R+S$, $u_2=2R$, $u_0=T+P$, $u_{-1}=2P$. Defector $0$ outscores both its neighbours and stays. Cooperator $1$1952sees defector $0$ and cooperator $2$, and stays exactly when $2R>T+P$. So a cluster never grows; it is1953frozen if $2R>T+P$ and loses one player at each end per round if $2R<T+P$. For $(1.1,1,0,-0.1)$,1954$2>1.1$: frozen. For $(1.5,1,0.6,0)$, $2<2.1$: eroded.1955 1956\sol{7.4} Let $M$ be the set of mutants and $m=\sum_{i,j\in M}w_{ij}$. The number of mutants increases with1957probability proportional to $r\sum_{i\in M,\,j\notin M}w_{ij}=r(|M|-m)$, using row sums, and decreases with1958probability proportional to $\sum_{i\notin M,\,j\in M}w_{ij}=|M|-m$, using column sums, with the same1959constant. The ratio is $r$. On the star each leaf sends its offspring to the centre, so the column of the1960centre sums to $N-1$ and that of a leaf to $1/(N-1)$.1961%% ---- end ch/D-solutions.tex ----1962\backmatter1963%% ---- begin bib.tex ----1964\chapter{References}1965\begingroup\small1966\renewcommand{\chapter}[2]{}1967\noindent Entries were assembled from memory, except \cite{OPP19}, whose authors, title and venue were checked1968against the publisher's page on 17 November 2026. Volume and page numbers in particular should be verified1969before they are relied on.1970\begin{thebibliography}{CMOP11}\setlength{\itemsep}{1pt}1971\newcommand{\bi}[1]{\bibitem[#1]{#1}}1972\bi{Aki79} E.~Akin, \emph{The Geometry of Population Genetics}, Lecture Notes in Biomathematics 31, Springer, 1979.1973\bi{Alex07} J.~M.~Alexander, \emph{The Structural Evolution of Morality}, Cambridge University Press, 2007.1974\bi{Alex23} J.~M.~Alexander, \emph{Evolutionary Game Theory}, Elements in Decision Theory and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 2023. The source.1975\bi{ASS80} A.~Arneodo, P.~Coullet, C.~Tresser, Occurrence of strange attractors in three-dimensional Volterra equations, \emph{Phys.\ Lett.\ A} 79 (1980), 259--263.1976\bi{BaFr14} J.~C.~Baez, T.~Fritz, A Bayesian characterization of relative entropy, \emph{Theory Appl.\ Categ.} 29 (2014), 422--456.1977\bi{BaPo16} J.~C.~Baez, B.~S.~Pollard, Relative entropy in biological systems, \emph{Entropy} 18 (2016), no.~2, 46.1978\bi{BaSc01} D.~Balkenborg, K.~H.~Schlag, Evolutionarily stable sets, \emph{Internat.\ J.~Game Theory} 29 (2001), 571--595.1979\bi{BiCa76} D.~T.~Bishop, C.~Cannings, Models of animal conflict, \emph{Adv.\ Appl.\ Probab.} 8 (1976), 616--621.1980\bi{BjWe96} J.~Bj\"ornerstedt, J.~W.~Weibull, Nash equilibrium and evolution by imitation, in \emph{The Rational Foundations of Economic Behaviour}, Macmillan, 1996, 155--171.