Independent scholarship · Open accessThe monthly digest

Indexed text attachment

evolutionary-game-theory-in-higher-categories.tex

Source for Evolutionary Game Theory in Higher Categories

View paper · Download original file

Lines 1841–1940 of 2037. Source text is displayed literally.

1841$\begin{psmallmatrix}0&V/2\\(C-V)/2&0\end{psmallmatrix}$, so $a=V/2$ and $b=(C-V)/2$. For $V<C$ both are positive:1842neither pure state is an equilibrium and the mixed equilibrium has Hawk at frequency $a/(a+b)=V/C$. For1843$V>C$, $a>0>b$: Hawk strictly dominates and All-Hawk is the only equilibrium.1844 1845\sol{1.4} By \Cref{prop:nashmaps}(a) applied to the clone map onto Hawk--Dove, the equilibria are exactly the1846states whose image is the mixed equilibrium: $(V/C,\,s,\,1-V/C-s)$ with $0\le s\le1-V/C$. They form a segment.1847 1848\section*{Chapter 2}1849 1850\sol{2.1} If $x$ is strict, then $\pay{x}{x}>\pay{y}{x}$ for $y\ne x$, which is the first clause of the definition.1851In a two-strategy game let $x$ be a pure ESS, say the first strategy. It is an equilibrium, so $A_{11}\ge A_{21}$,1852and by hypothesis the inequality is strict; then $x$ is strict. An ESS that is not pure is interior.1853 1854\sol{2.2} The uniform state is an interior equilibrium, so by \Cref{thm:essprops}(f) it is an ESS if and only if1855$z^{\T}Az<0$ for $z\ne0$ with $\sum_sz_s=0$. Here $z^{\T}Az=(a-b)(z_1z_2+z_2z_3+z_3z_1)$ and1856$z_1z_2+z_2z_3+z_3z_1=-\tfrac12|z|^2$ on that plane, so $z^{\T}Az=-\tfrac{a-b}2|z|^2$, negative exactly when $a>b$.1857 1858\sol{2.3} The identity matrix: each pure strategy is a strict equilibrium, hence an ESS, and1859$\binom31=3$.1860 1861\sol{2.4} Write $y=(1-q,q)$, with $q$ the weight on the second strategy. For $x$ the first pure strategy,1862$\pay{x}{y}=1+99q$ and $\pay{y}{y}=(1-q)(1+99q)+100q^2$, so $\Q_x(y)=q(1+99q)-100q^2=q(1-q)>0$ for $0<q<1$: an ESS. For1863$x$ the second, with $p=1-q$ the weight on the first, $\Q_x(y)=-p^2<0$: not an ESS, although it is an equilibrium.1864 1865\section*{Chapter 3}1866 1867\sol{3.1} With payoffs $\begin{psmallmatrix}0&a\\b&0\end{psmallmatrix}$ and state $(x,1-x)$, the two strategies1868earn $a(1-x)$ and $bx$, and $\dot x=x(1-x)\bigl(a(1-x)-bx\bigr)$. For $\dot x=x^2(1-x)$, partial fractions give1869$\int\frac{dx}{x^2(1-x)}=-\frac1x+\log\frac{x}{1-x}$; evaluate between $x_0$ and $x_1$.1870 1871\sol{3.2} $\frac d{dt}x^{\T}Ax=\dot x^{\T}(A+A^{\T})x=2\sum_sx_s\bigl((Ax)_s-x^{\T}Ax\bigr)(Sx)_s1872=2\operatorname{Cov}_x(Sx,Ax)$, because $\sum_sx_s\bigl((Ax)_s-x^{\T}Ax\bigr)=0$. For symmetric $A$ this is twice the1873variance of $Ax$.1874 1875\sol{3.3} At the uniform state the linearization on the tangent plane is $\tfrac13A$ composed with the projection1876along $\one$. In the basis of the two complex eigenvectors of the cyclic shift, $A$ acts by1877$a\omega+(-b)\bar\omega$ and its conjugate, with $\omega=e^{2\pi i/3}$, so the eigenvalues are1878$\tfrac13(a\omega-b\bar\omega)$ and its conjugate: real part $\tfrac13\cdot\tfrac{-a+b}{2}$, imaginary part1879$\pm\tfrac13\cdot\tfrac{\sqrt3}2(a+b)$. The trace is $(b-a)/3$ and the determinant1880$\bigl((b-a)^2+3(a+b)^2\bigr)/36$.1881 1882\sol{3.4} By \Cref{cor:three}(b) the class frequencies follow the replicator equation of Rock--Paper--Scissors1883from the initial state $(\tfrac12,\tfrac14,\tfrac14)$. By \Cref{thm:zerosum} they move on the closed curve1884on which the relative entropy to the centre is constant, equivalently on which the product of the three1885frequencies equals $\tfrac1{32}$. The two variants of Rock keep equal shares.1886 1887\section*{Chapter 4}1888 1889\sol{4.1} Let $F(x)=x(1-x)\bigl(a-(a+b)x\bigr)$; the index at an equilibrium is the sign of $-F'$. For $a>0>b$ the1890only equilibrium is $x=1$, with $F'(1)=b<0$: index $+1$. For $a,b>0$ the only equilibrium is1891$x^*=a/(a+b)$, with $F'(x^*)=-(a+b)x^*(1-x^*)<0$: index $+1$. For $a,b<0$ the equilibria are $0$, $1$ and $x^*$,1892with $F'(0)=a<0$, $F'(1)=b<0$ and $F'(x^*)>0$: indices $+1,+1,-1$. The sum is $1$ in each case.1893 1894\sol{4.2} A gradient has zero curl on every triangle. Conversely, if the curl vanishes on triangles through1895the vertex $0$, put $r_i=K_{i0}$. Then $K_{ij}+K_{j0}+K_{0i}=0$ gives $K_{ij}=K_{i0}-K_{j0}=r_i-r_j$.1896 1897\sol{4.3} The row means are $r=\bigl(\tfrac{1+t}3,0,-\tfrac{1+t}3\bigr)$, so $G_{12}=G_{23}=\tfrac{1+t}3$,1898$G_{13}=\tfrac{2(1+t)}3$, and $C_{12}=C_{23}=\tfrac{2-t}3$, $C_{13}=-\tfrac{2-t}3$. The curl is $2-t$, and1899\[ \tau=\frac{2(1+t)^2}{3(2+t^2)} . \]1900It equals $1$ at $t=2$, where the game is a rating difference, and $0$ at $t=-1$, which is1901Rock--Paper--Scissors.1902 1903\sol{4.4} Dove invades Hawk, since $0>(V-C)/2$, and Hawk invades Dove, since $V>V/2$. The graph is a1904two-cycle and its only sink component is the whole of it. This records correctly that neither pure state1905persists, and it misses the outcome: the flow converges to the mixed state, which is not a vertex.1906 1907\section*{Chapter 5}1908 1909\sol{5.1} $\dot x_i=\sum_jx_jx_i(K-\pi_j)-x_i(K-\pi_i)\sum_jx_j=x_i(K-\bar\pi)-x_i(K-\pi_i)=x_i(\pi_i-\bar\pi)$.1910 1911\sol{5.2} At a Nash equilibrium no strategy earns more than the mean, so $k=0$ and the field vanishes.1912Conversely, let $\dot x=0$ and suppose $\kappa=\sum_jk_j>0$. Then $x_i=k_i/\kappa$ for all $i$, so the support of1913$x$ consists of strategies earning strictly more than the mean, which contradicts1914$\sum_ix_i(\pi_i-\bar\pi)=0$. Hence $k=0$, which is the equilibrium condition.1915 1916\sol{5.3} Let $z(t)=\log x(0)+\int_0^t\pi$ and $x=\operatorname{softmax}(z)$. Then1917$\frac d{dt}\log x_i=\pi_i-\frac d{dt}\log\sum_je^{z_j}=\pi_i-\sum_jx_j\pi_j$.1918 1919\sol{5.4} Row's two strategies earn $2y$ and $1-y$; Column's earn $x$ and $2(1-x)$. Hence1920$\dot x=x(1-x)(3y-1)$ and $\dot y=y(1-y)(3x-2)$. At $(\tfrac23,\tfrac13)$ the Jacobian has zero diagonal and both1921off-diagonal entries equal to $3\cdot\tfrac29=\tfrac23$; its eigenvalues are $\pm\tfrac23$.1922 1923\section*{Chapter 6}1924 1925\sol{6.1} With equal fitnesses the number of $A$-players is a bounded martingale, so its expectation at1926absorption equals its initial value: $N\rho=1$. Alternatively, each of the $N$ initial individuals is equally1927likely to be the ancestor of the final population.1928 1929\sol{6.2} Here $g_i/f_i=r^{-1}$ for every $i$, and1930$1+\sum_{k=1}^{N-1}r^{-k}=(1-r^{-N})/(1-r^{-1})$.1931 1932\sol{6.3} Dividing by $N$ and letting $N\to\infty$ gives $a+2b>c+2d$, that is, $a-c>2(d-b)$. With $a>c$ and $d>b$1933this is $x^*=(d-b)/\bigl((a-c)+(d-b)\bigr)<\tfrac13$.1934 1935\sol{6.4} With $i$ cooperators,1936$\frac{g_i}{f_i}=\frac{4i+2(N-i-1)}{3(i-1)+(N-i)}=\frac{2i+2N-2}{2i+N-3}$, which decreases in $i$ and at $i=N-1$1937equals $\frac{4N-4}{3N-5}>\tfrac43$. The last term of the sum in \Cref{thm:fix} alone exceeds $(4/3)^{N-1}$.1938 1939\section*{Chapter 7}1940