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1701function on ordered pairs of adjacent vertices. The differential sends $r$ to $(i,j)\mapsto r_i-r_j$. A1702$1$-cochain is closed if its sum around every triangle vanishes. On the complete graph every closed1703$1$-cochain is a differential.1704 1705\paragraph{Coverings and symmetries.} A covering of graphs is a homomorphism bijective on the neighbourhood1706of each vertex. An automorphism of a graph is a covering of the graph by itself. A map between dynamical1707systems on configuration spaces that commutes with the updates sends orbits to orbits, periodic orbits to1708periodic orbits of period dividing the original, and invariant sets to invariant sets.1709%% ---- end ch/A-toolkit.tex ----1710%% ---- begin ch/B-concordance.tex ----1711\chapter{Concordance with the Source}\label{app:concordance}1712 1713The table lists the sections of J.~McKenzie Alexander, \emph{Evolutionary Game Theory} \cite{Alex23}, with the1714place in this volume where their content is treated and the form it takes there. The source was read from a1715text extraction of its PDF; its definitions and theorems were located by search and read in context, and the1716remaining text was read selectively, section by section. Figures were not consulted except through their1717captions and the surrounding discussion.1718 1719{\small1720\begin{longtable}{@{}>{\raggedright}p{0.29\textwidth}>{\raggedright}p{0.19\textwidth}>{\raggedright\arraybackslash}p{0.44\textwidth}@{}}1721\toprule1722Source & Here & Form\\1723\midrule1724\endhead17251.1 Rock, Paper, Scissors (Lizard, Spock) & \Cref{ex:rps} & circulant games; their automorphism groups\\17261.2--1.3 Game theory; fundamentals & \Cref{ch:games} & the distribution monad; the category $\Game$; Nash's theorem for symmetric games\\17272.1 Basic concepts (Definitions 1--4) & \Cref{thm:essequiv} & one quadratic form $Q_x$; the ray identity \eqref{eq:ray}\\17282.1 Drift game; Hawk--Dove & \Cref{ex:hd}, \Cref{ch:replicator} & $Q=C(p-q)^2/2$; escape time from a neutrally stable state\\17292.2 Properties (Theorems 1--5) & \Cref{thm:essprops} & stated with proofs or references; the Bishop--Cannings bound\\17302.3 Evolutionarily stable sets & \Cref{thm:esset} & pullback along clone maps preserves stable sets and destroys stable points\\17313.1 Introduction & \Cref{ch:replicator} & the category $\Dyn$\\17323.2 Replicator dynamics (Definition 11) & \Cref{prop:quotient}, \Cref{thm:natural} & quotient of the growth equation; functoriality\\17333.2.1 Biological derivation & \Cref{prop:quotient} & as stated\\17343.2.2 Cultural derivation & \Cref{prop:ppi} & mean dynamic of an imitative revision protocol\\17353.2.3 Simple games & \Cref{ch:replicator}, two strategies & one normal form with three generic cases\\17363.2.4 Stability (Theorems 6, 7) & \Cref{thm:kl}, \Cref{thm:folk}, \Cref{thm:elim} & relative entropy as Lyapunov function; elimination with its rate\\17373.2.4 Rock--Paper--Scissors variants & \Cref{thm:zerosum}, \Cref{prop:grps}, \Cref{thm:hodge} & conserved quantity; eigenvalues; cyclic part of a game\\17383.2.4 Classification for three strategies & \Cref{ch:replicator} & cited only\\17393.2.5 Chaos & \Cref{ch:coda} & not treated\\17403.3 Other dynamics (Theorem 8) & \Cref{thm:hs}, \Cref{prop:names} & naturality separates imitation from innovation\\17413.4 Multipopulation games & \Cref{thm:selten} & two boxes and a wiring\\17424.1 Birth--death process & \Cref{thm:fix}, \Cref{prop:limit}, \Cref{rem:limits} & the source's table recomputed; two limits\\17434.2 Local interaction & \Cref{thm:covering} & functoriality for coverings\\17444.2.1 Rock--Paper--Scissors on a ring & \Cref{prop:ring} & twisted symmetry; rotating wave\\17454.2.2 Prisoner's Dilemma on graphs & \Cref{prop:thresholds} & thresholds; the source's run reproduced\\17464.2.3 Centipede game & \Cref{ch:local}, Notes & not reproduced\\17475 Conclusion & \Cref{ch:coda} & what naturality contributes to robustness\\1748--- & \Cref{thm:index}, \Cref{thm:conley}, \Cref{thm:conleyindex} & added: index theorem, chain recurrence, Conley index\\1749--- & \Cref{thm:kurtz}, \Cref{thm:third} & added: mean-field limit, one-third law\\1750--- & \Cref{thm:iso} & added: isothermal theorem, amplifiers and suppressors\\1751\bottomrule1752\end{longtable}}1753%% ---- end ch/B-concordance.tex ----1754%% ---- begin ch/C-computations.tex ----1755\chapter{Computations}\label{app:computations}1756 1757The script \texttt{verify-evolutionary-games.py} that accompanies this volume uses only the Python standard1758library, fixes its random seed, and runs in about ten seconds. It performs 42 checks, each printing1759\texttt{PASS} or \texttt{FAIL} with the computed values, and exits with status zero if and only if all pass.1760The checks recompute the numerical statements of the text and test finite or numerical instances of the1761structural ones. They are evidence that the examples are stated correctly; they do not prove the theorems.1762Differential equations are integrated with a fourth-order Runge--Kutta scheme; fixation probabilities are1763computed exactly, from the product formula or by solving the linear system for absorption.1764 1765{\small1766\begin{longtable}{@{}p{0.08\textwidth}>{\raggedright\arraybackslash}p{0.85\textwidth}@{}}1767\toprule1768Check & What is computed\\1769\midrule1770\endhead1771S1 & Hawk--Dove with $V=2$, $C=4$: $Q_{x^*}(y)=C(p-q)^2/2$ on a grid of states (\Cref{ex:hd})\\1772S2 & Rock--Paper--Scissors: the uniform state is the only Nash equilibrium and is not an ESS\\1773S3 & the source's game with a weakly dominated equilibrium strategy: not an ESS (\Cref{thm:essprops})\\1774S4 & drift game: the neutral equilibrium is left by the replicator flow; time from $0.05$ to $\tfrac12$ is $20.944$\\1775S5 & Hawk--Dove with $V<C$ has exactly one ESS, the mixed one\\1776S6 & \Cref{thm:esset}: over the mixed ESS of Hawk--Dove with Dove duplicated, the fibre is a stable set and no point of it is an ESS\\1777R1 & \Cref{thm:natural} on random games: pushforward along a clone surjection and a subgame inclusion carries solutions to solutions\\1778R2 & \Cref{thm:gradient}: $\frac d{dt}$(mean payoff) $=2\operatorname{Var}$ for symmetric matrices\\1779R3 & \Cref{thm:kl}: $\frac d{dt}\KL{x^*}{x}=-Q_{x^*}(x)$ along numerical solutions\\1780R4 & \Cref{thm:zerosum}: the relative entropy to the centre is conserved, drift $1.3\times10^{-15}$ over time $40$\\1781R5 & \Cref{prop:grps}: eigenvalues $(b-a)/6\pm i\sqrt3(a+b)/6$ against a numerical Jacobian\\1782R6 & good Rock--Paper--Scissors converges to the centre; bad Rock--Paper--Scissors leaves every compact subset of the interior\\1783R7 & every Nash equilibrium of random games is a rest point\\1784R8 & the source's three-strategy game: the unique equilibrium is uniform, asymptotically stable, and not an ESS\\1785R9 & \Cref{thm:elim}: the log-ratio of a dominated twin to its original falls at exactly the penalty\\1786I1 & \Cref{thm:index} on 400 random games with three or four strategies: indices sum to $1$, the number of equilibria is odd\\1787I2 & all 590 ESS found (by Haigh's criterion) have index $+1$\\1788I3 & coordination game: indices $+1,+1,-1$\\1789I4 & \Cref{thm:hodge}: Rock--Paper--Scissors is purely cyclic, a rating difference purely transitive, the parts orthogonal; $\tau=0.558$ for a random game\\1790I5 & the gradient part is a cocycle on every triangle; the cyclic part carries all the curl\\1791I6 & $\frac d{dt}x^{\T}Ax=2\operatorname{Cov}_x(Sx,Ax)$ on random games\\1792I7 & sink components of the invasion graph for three standard games; the small-mutation chain concentrates on them\\1793O1 & \Cref{prop:ppi} on random games and states\\1794O2 & at All-Cooperate the replicator field vanishes and the two direct dynamics do not\\1795O3 & both direct dynamics vanish at every Nash equilibrium of sixty random games\\1796O4 & \Cref{thm:hs}: time-averaged share $0.116$ of a dominated twin under the Smith dynamic; extinction under the replicator\\1797O5 & Battle of the Sexes with two populations: the mixed equilibrium is a rest point, and forty nearby orbits end at the two pure equilibria\\1798O6 & \Cref{prop:softmax} against a numerical solution\\1799O7 & \Cref{prop:names}(c): defect of naturality under cloning, $4\times10^{-17}$ for the replicator, $0.555$ for Smith, $0.380$ for Brown--von Neumann--Nash\\1800F1 & the source's table of fixation probabilities, with and without self-interaction\\