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evolutionary-game-theory-in-higher-categories.tex
Source for Evolutionary Game Theory in Higher Categories
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1481\Sob Consider a run of at least five cooperators next to a run of at least five defectors. Under1482imitate-the-best the boundary between them1483\begin{center}1484\begin{tabular}{@{}ll@{}}1485moves into the defectors, one place per round, & if $3R+S>2T+2P$;\\1486is stationary & if $3R+S<2T+2P<4R$;\\1487moves into the cooperators, two places per round, & if $2T+2P>4R$.1488\end{tabular}1489\end{center}1490\end{proposition}1491\begin{proof}1492Number the cooperators $1,2,3,\dots$ from the boundary and the defectors $0,-1,-2,\dots$. The scores are1493\begin{align*} u_1&=2R+2S, & u_2&=3R+S, & u_3&=4R,\\ u_0&=2T+2P, & u_{-1}&=T+3P, & u_{-2}&=4P . \end{align*}1494Defector $0$ sees players $-2,\dots,2$: the best defector it sees is itself and the best cooperator is player $2$,1495so it switches exactly when $3R+S>2T+2P$. Defector $-1$ sees player $0$, who outscores the only cooperator in1496view, and stays; the remaining defectors see no cooperator. Cooperators $1$ and $2$ both see defector $0$ and cooperator $3$, and stay exactly when1497$4R>2T+2P$; cooperator $3$ sees only cooperators and player $0$ is out of its sight.1498\end{proof}1499 1500With $R=1$, $P=S=0$ and $T=b$ the thresholds are $b=\tfrac32$ and $b=2$. Starting from six cooperators among1501thirty players, the cluster grew by two per round for $b=1.1$, stayed at six for $b=1.7$, and vanished in1502two rounds for $b=2.1$. \chk{L6} For the source's matrix $(T,R,P,S)=(1.1,1,0,-0.1)$ the first inequality reads1503$2.9>2.2$, which are the two scores the source quotes for the cooperator and the boundary defector. The1504simulation then reproduces the rest of the source's account: the cooperators spread until one defector1505remains; the lone defector scores $4T=4.4$ and converts its four neighbours; the block of five defectors1506shrinks to three and to one; and the number of defectors cycles $1,5,3$ for ever. On the simple ring the same1507cluster is frozen for this matrix and eroded for the source's second matrix $(1.5,1,0.6,0)$, as the source1508states. \chk{L7}1509 1510\begin{remark}1511The mechanism is visible in the proof: cooperation spreads when the cooperator one step behind the front,1512who has three cooperating neighbours, outscores the defector at the front, who exploits two. On the simple1513ring there is no such player. The source's caution that results of this kind depend on the neighbourhood, the1514payoffs and the update rule is exactly right, and the proposition says how: through three linear inequalities1515that change with each of them.1516\end{remark}1517 1518\section{Graphs that amplify and suppress selection}1519 1520For constant fitness the Moran process can be run on a weighted directed graph: an individual at $i$,1521chosen in proportion to fitness, places its offspring at $j$ with probability $w_{ij}$, where $W$ is a1522stochastic matrix.1523 1524\begin{theorem}[Isothermal theorem]\label{thm:iso}1525\Sli[\cite{LHN05}] The fixation probability of a single mutant of fitness $r$, placed uniformly at random,1526equals the Moran value $(1-r^{-1})/(1-r^{-N})$ for every $r$ if and only if $W$ is doubly stochastic.1527\end{theorem}1528 1529\noindent A doubly stochastic matrix is a stochastic map that preserves the uniform distribution, so the1530isothermal graphs are the endomorphisms of the probability space $(V,\text{uniform})$ in $\FinStoch$. For them1531the number of mutants is itself a birth--death chain with ratio $r$ (\Cref{exer:iso}), and structure is1532invisible to selection: on the complete graph and on the cycle the computed fixation probabilities agree1533with the Moran value to ten digits. \chk{L4} Other graphs change the balance between selection and drift.1534\begin{center}1535\begin{tabular}{@{}lccc@{}}1536\toprule1537$N=6$ & well-mixed & star & directed line\\1538\midrule1539advantageous mutant, $r=1.5$ & $0.3654$ & $0.4432$ & $0.1667$\\1540disadvantageous mutant, $r=0.7$ & $0.0571$ & $0.0333$ & $0.1667$\\1541\bottomrule1542\end{tabular}1543\end{center}1544The star amplifies selection in both directions, and on the directed line only a mutant at the root can1545take over, so fixation is $1/N$ whatever the fitness. \chk{L5} The values are exact, from the linear system1546for the absorption probabilities on all $2^6$ subsets.1547 1548\section*{Notes}1549 1550Local-interaction models of this kind go back to Nowak and May \cite{NoMa92}; the source's examples are in the1551tradition of Skyrms's and Alexander's work on the evolution of social structure \cite{Sky04,Alex07}. Evolutionary1552graph theory, the isothermal theorem, amplifiers and suppressors are from \cite{LHN05}. The source ends with a1553simulation of the centipede game on a lattice, in which the socially optimal outcome occurs $13.3$ per cent of1554the time, close to the figure of about $15$ per cent in the experiments of McKelvey and Palfrey1555\src{\S4.2.3}; we have not reproduced it, since it depends on the distribution of initial conditions, which the1556functorial statements above do not see.1557 1558\section*{Exercises}1559 1560\begin{exercise}\label{exer:cover}1561Show that reduction modulo $n$ is a covering $C_{kn}\to C_n$ for $n\ge3$ and not for $n=2$.1562\end{exercise}1563 1564\begin{exercise}\label{exer:twist}1565Verify that the configurations on $C_9$ fixed by the twisted symmetry of \Cref{prop:ring} number $27$, that1566each uses every strategy exactly three times, and that $RPS\,RPS\,RPS$ is a fixed point of $U$ that is not1567among them.1568\end{exercise}1569 1570\begin{exercise}\label{exer:ring2}1571Repeat the analysis of \Cref{prop:thresholds} for the simple ring, and recover the source's two examples.1572\end{exercise}1573 1574\begin{exercise}\label{exer:iso}1575Show that for doubly stochastic $W$ the ratio of the probabilities that the number of mutants increases and1576decreases is $r$ in every state. Why is the star not isothermal?1577\end{exercise}1578%% ---- end ch/07-local.tex ----1579\part{Assessment}1580%% ---- begin ch/08-coda.tex ----