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evolutionary-game-theory-in-higher-categories.tex
Source for Evolutionary Game Theory in Higher Categories
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1141\node[draw,thick,minimum width=1.9cm,minimum height=0.9cm] (p) at (0,0) {population};1142\node[draw,minimum width=1cm,minimum height=0.7cm] (a) at (0,-1.5) {$A$};1143\draw[->] (p.east) -- ++(0.8,0) |- node[pos=0.25,right]{$x$} (a.east);1144\draw[->] (a.west) -- ++(-1.25,0) |- node[pos=0.25,left]{$\pi=Ax$} (p.west);1145\node at (0,-2.4) {one population};1146\begin{scope}[xshift=6.3cm]1147\node[draw,thick,minimum width=1.5cm,minimum height=0.9cm] (r) at (-1.6,0) {row};1148\node[draw,thick,minimum width=1.5cm,minimum height=0.9cm] (c) at (1.6,0) {column};1149\node[draw,minimum width=0.9cm,minimum height=0.7cm] (a2) at (0,0.75) {$B^{\T}$};1150\node[draw,minimum width=0.9cm,minimum height=0.7cm] (b2) at (0,-0.75) {$A$};1151\draw[->] (r.north) |- node[pos=0.25,left]{$x$} (a2.west);1152\draw[->] (a2.east) -| (c.north);1153\draw[->] (c.south) |- node[pos=0.25,right]{$y$} (b2.east);1154\draw[->] (b2.west) -| (r.south);1155\node at (0,-2.4) {two populations};1156\end{scope}1157\end{tikzpicture}1158\end{center}1159 1160\begin{remark}\label{rem:wiring}1161\Srf[\cite{SSV20,Mye21}] Open dynamical systems are the algebras of an operad of wiring diagrams: a diagram1162with boxes of given interfaces determines a closed system once each box is filled. A symmetric game is the1163one-box diagram with feedback through $A$; a bimatrix game is the two-box diagram; a local-interaction model1164(\Cref{ch:local}) has one box per vertex of a graph. Replacing the replicator box by a1165Smith box changes the dynamics and not the diagram. The statement that the source's models differ ``only in1166the dynamics'' or ``only in the interaction structure'' is the statement that a model is a pair of a diagram1167and a filling.1168\end{remark}1169 1170\section{Two populations}1171 1172For a bimatrix game $(A,B)$ the two-box system with replicator boxes is1173\[ \dot x_i=x_i\bigl((Ay)_i-x^{\T}Ay\bigr),\qquad\dot y_j=y_j\bigl((B^{\T}x)_j-y^{\T}B^{\T}x\bigr) \]1174on $\Dist(S)\times\Dist(T)$. The single-population equation for $A$ is its restriction to the diagonal in the case1175$B=A^{\T}$: the diagonal is the fixed set of the symmetry exchanging the two boxes.1176 1177\begin{theorem}\label{thm:selten}1178\Scl[\cite{Sel80,RiWe95,HoSi98}] In the two-population replicator dynamics a rest point is asymptotically stable if and1179only if it is a strict Nash equilibrium. In particular no mixed equilibrium is asymptotically stable.1180\end{theorem}1181 1182\noindent After a change of velocity the flow in the interior preserves volume, which excludes interior1183attractors. For the source's Battle of the Sexes, with payoffs $A=\begin{psmallmatrix}2&0\\0&1\end{psmallmatrix}$ to1184Row and $B=\begin{psmallmatrix}1&0\\0&2\end{psmallmatrix}$ to Column, the mixed equilibrium $(x,y)=(\tfrac23,\tfrac13)$1185is a saddle with eigenvalues $\pm\tfrac23$, and orbits started near it end at one of the two pure1186equilibria. \chk{O5} The population model selects conventions and never the mixed equilibrium, which is the1187content of the source's discussion \src{\S3.4}.1188 1189\section*{Notes}1190 1191Revision protocols and mean dynamics are developed systematically in \cite{San10}; proportional imitation1192is due to Schlag \cite{Sch98} and, in a different form, to Bj\"ornerstedt and Weibull \cite{BjWe96}. The1193Brown--von Neumann--Nash dynamic is from \cite{BvN50} and the Smith dynamic from \cite{Smi84}. Elimination of1194dominated strategies under imitative dynamics is in \cite{Nac90,SaZh92}. For open dynamical systems and1195wiring diagrams see \cite{SSV20,Mye21}; for games assembled compositionally from open pieces, \cite{GHWZ18}1196and \cite{GIHC}.1197 1198\section*{Exercises}1199 1200\begin{exercise}\label{exer:dissat}1201Show that \emph{imitation driven by dissatisfaction}, $\rho_{ij}=x_j(K-\pi_i)$ with $K$ larger than every payoff,1202also has the replicator equation as its mean dynamic.1203\end{exercise}1204 1205\begin{exercise}\label{exer:bnnrest}1206Show directly that the rest points of the Brown--von Neumann--Nash dynamic are exactly the Nash equilibria.1207\end{exercise}1208 1209\begin{exercise}\label{exer:softmax}1210Prove \Cref{prop:softmax}.1211\end{exercise}1212 1213\begin{exercise}\label{exer:bos}1214Write the two-population replicator equations for the Battle of the Sexes above in the coordinates $(x,y)$,1215and verify the eigenvalues $\pm\tfrac23$ at the mixed equilibrium.1216\end{exercise}1217%% ---- end ch/05-protocols.tex ----1218\part{Structure}1219%% ---- begin ch/06-finite.tex ----1220\chapter{Finite Populations}\label{ch:finite}1221 1222A real population is finite, and in a finite population chance decides what the differential equation leaves1223open. The source's model is the frequency-dependent birth--death process \src{\S4.1}. Its analysis is1224classical, and we shall say plainly at the end how little the categorical language adds to it. What it does1225add is a precise statement of the one point at which the source draws a conclusion that needs qualifying.1226 1227\section{The Moran process}1228 1229Two strategies $A$ and $B$ have payoffs $\begin{psmallmatrix}a&b\\c&d\end{psmallmatrix}$, all positive. In a population1230of $N$ with $i$ players of type $A$, the expected payoffs against a randomly chosen other player are1231\[ F_i=\frac{a(i-1)+b(N-i)}{N-1},\qquad G_i=\frac{c\,i+d(N-i-1)}{N-1}, \]1232and the fitnesses are $f_i=1-w+wF_i$, $g_i=1-w+wG_i$ for an intensity of selection $w\in(0,1]$. At each step one1233individual is chosen to reproduce with probability proportional to fitness, and its offspring replaces a1234uniformly chosen individual. The number of $A$-players is a Markov chain on $\{0,\dots,N\}$, that is, an1235endomorphism in $\FinStoch$, with1236\[ p_i^+=\frac{if_i}{if_i+(N-i)g_i}\cdot\frac{N-i}{N},\qquad p_i^-=\frac{(N-i)g_i}{if_i+(N-i)g_i}\cdot\frac iN, \]1237and $0$ and $N$ absorbing.1238 1239\begin{theorem}[Fixation]\label{thm:fix}1240\Scl[\cite{Mor58,Now06}] The probability that a single $A$-player takes over the population is