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evolutionary-game-theory-in-higher-categories.tex
Source for Evolutionary Game Theory in Higher Categories
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1121 1122\begin{definition}1123A \term{population box} on $S$ is an open dynamical system with input a payoff vector $\pi\in\R^S$, state1124$x\in\Dist(S)$, output the state, and dynamics $\dot x=V(x,\pi)$. The \term{replicator box} has1125$V_i=x_i(\pi_i-x\cdot\pi)$.1126\end{definition}1127 1128\begin{proposition}[The replicator box integrates and normalizes]\label{prop:softmax}1129\Scl For any integrable input $\pi(\cdot)$ and interior initial state, the replicator box has the solution1130\[ x(t)=\operatorname{softmax}\Bigl(\log x(0)+\int_0^t\pi(\tau)\,d\tau\Bigr). \]1131In the coordinates $z=\log x$ modulo constants the box is the integrator $\dot z=\pi$. \chk{O6}1132\end{proposition}1133 1134\noindent All the nonlinearity of the replicator equation is in the game and in the readout, the map1135$\operatorname{softmax}$ from $\R^S/\R\one$ onto the open simplex; the box itself is linear. The Lyapunov function of \Cref{thm:kl} is1136the Bregman divergence of the convex function whose gradient is this readout.1137 1138A game is then a way of closing boxes.1139\begin{center}1140\begin{tikzpicture}[>=stealth,scale=0.95,every node/.style={font=\small}]1141\node[draw,thick,minimum width=1.9cm,minimum height=0.9cm] (p) at (0,0) {population};1142\node[draw,minimum width=1cm,minimum height=0.7cm] (a) at (0,-1.5) {$A$};1143\draw[->] (p.east) -- ++(0.8,0) |- node[pos=0.25,right]{$x$} (a.east);1144\draw[->] (a.west) -- ++(-1.25,0) |- node[pos=0.25,left]{$\pi=Ax$} (p.west);1145\node at (0,-2.4) {one population};1146\begin{scope}[xshift=6.3cm]1147\node[draw,thick,minimum width=1.5cm,minimum height=0.9cm] (r) at (-1.6,0) {row};1148\node[draw,thick,minimum width=1.5cm,minimum height=0.9cm] (c) at (1.6,0) {column};1149\node[draw,minimum width=0.9cm,minimum height=0.7cm] (a2) at (0,0.75) {$B^{\T}$};1150\node[draw,minimum width=0.9cm,minimum height=0.7cm] (b2) at (0,-0.75) {$A$};1151\draw[->] (r.north) |- node[pos=0.25,left]{$x$} (a2.west);1152\draw[->] (a2.east) -| (c.north);1153\draw[->] (c.south) |- node[pos=0.25,right]{$y$} (b2.east);1154\draw[->] (b2.west) -| (r.south);1155\node at (0,-2.4) {two populations};1156\end{scope}1157\end{tikzpicture}1158\end{center}1159 1160\begin{remark}\label{rem:wiring}1161\Srf[\cite{SSV20,Mye21}] Open dynamical systems are the algebras of an operad of wiring diagrams: a diagram1162with boxes of given interfaces determines a closed system once each box is filled. A symmetric game is the1163one-box diagram with feedback through $A$; a bimatrix game is the two-box diagram; a local-interaction model1164(\Cref{ch:local}) has one box per vertex of a graph. Replacing the replicator box by a1165Smith box changes the dynamics and not the diagram. The statement that the source's models differ ``only in1166the dynamics'' or ``only in the interaction structure'' is the statement that a model is a pair of a diagram1167and a filling.1168\end{remark}1169 1170\section{Two populations}1171 1172For a bimatrix game $(A,B)$ the two-box system with replicator boxes is1173\[ \dot x_i=x_i\bigl((Ay)_i-x^{\T}Ay\bigr),\qquad\dot y_j=y_j\bigl((B^{\T}x)_j-y^{\T}B^{\T}x\bigr) \]1174on $\Dist(S)\times\Dist(T)$. The single-population equation for $A$ is its restriction to the diagonal in the case1175$B=A^{\T}$: the diagonal is the fixed set of the symmetry exchanging the two boxes.1176 1177\begin{theorem}\label{thm:selten}1178\Scl[\cite{Sel80,RiWe95,HoSi98}] In the two-population replicator dynamics a rest point is asymptotically stable if and1179only if it is a strict Nash equilibrium. In particular no mixed equilibrium is asymptotically stable.1180\end{theorem}1181 1182\noindent After a change of velocity the flow in the interior preserves volume, which excludes interior1183attractors. For the source's Battle of the Sexes, with payoffs $A=\begin{psmallmatrix}2&0\\0&1\end{psmallmatrix}$ to1184Row and $B=\begin{psmallmatrix}1&0\\0&2\end{psmallmatrix}$ to Column, the mixed equilibrium $(x,y)=(\tfrac23,\tfrac13)$1185is a saddle with eigenvalues $\pm\tfrac23$, and orbits started near it end at one of the two pure1186equilibria. \chk{O5} The population model selects conventions and never the mixed equilibrium, which is the1187content of the source's discussion \src{\S3.4}.1188 1189\section*{Notes}1190 1191Revision protocols and mean dynamics are developed systematically in \cite{San10}; proportional imitation1192is due to Schlag \cite{Sch98} and, in a different form, to Bj\"ornerstedt and Weibull \cite{BjWe96}. The1193Brown--von Neumann--Nash dynamic is from \cite{BvN50} and the Smith dynamic from \cite{Smi84}. Elimination of1194dominated strategies under imitative dynamics is in \cite{Nac90,SaZh92}. For open dynamical systems and1195wiring diagrams see \cite{SSV20,Mye21}; for games assembled compositionally from open pieces, \cite{GHWZ18}1196and \cite{GIHC}.1197 1198\section*{Exercises}1199 1200\begin{exercise}\label{exer:dissat}1201Show that \emph{imitation driven by dissatisfaction}, $\rho_{ij}=x_j(K-\pi_i)$ with $K$ larger than every payoff,1202also has the replicator equation as its mean dynamic.1203\end{exercise}1204 1205\begin{exercise}\label{exer:bnnrest}1206Show directly that the rest points of the Brown--von Neumann--Nash dynamic are exactly the Nash equilibria.1207\end{exercise}1208 1209\begin{exercise}\label{exer:softmax}1210Prove \Cref{prop:softmax}.1211\end{exercise}1212 1213\begin{exercise}\label{exer:bos}1214Write the two-population replicator equations for the Battle of the Sexes above in the coordinates $(x,y)$,1215and verify the eigenvalues $\pm\tfrac23$ at the mixed equilibrium.1216\end{exercise}1217%% ---- end ch/05-protocols.tex ----1218\part{Structure}1219%% ---- begin ch/06-finite.tex ----1220\chapter{Finite Populations}\label{ch:finite}