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1057exactly at Nash equilibria. \emph{Innovation}: if $x$ is not a Nash equilibrium and an unused strategy is a1058best reply to $x$, that strategy grows.1059 1060\begin{center}\small1061\begin{tabular}{@{}lcccc@{}}1062\toprule1063 & continuity & pos.\ correlation & Nash stationarity & innovation\\1064\midrule1065replicator & yes & yes & no & no\\1066BNN & yes & yes & yes & yes\\1067Smith & yes & yes & yes & yes\\1068\bottomrule1069\end{tabular}1070\end{center}1071 1072\noindent At All-Cooperate in the Prisoner's Dilemma the replicator field vanishes and the other two do1073not \chk{O2}; at every Nash equilibrium of sixty random games both of the others vanish. \chk{O3}1074 1075\begin{theorem}[Hofbauer--Sandholm]\label{thm:hs}1076\Sli[\cite{HoSa11}; source, Theorem 8] For every dynamic satisfying the four properties there is a game with a1077strictly dominated strategy that survives along solutions from most initial conditions.1078\end{theorem}1079 1080\noindent The example has the same shape for every such dynamic: a game with a cycle, and a twin of one1081strategy made slightly worse. In bad Rock--Paper--Scissors (win $1$, loss $2$) with a twin of Scissors that earns1082$0.1$ less, the twin's time-averaged share under the Smith dynamic is $0.116$; under the replicator equation1083it is zero, and \Cref{thm:elim} gives the rate. \chk{O4}1084 1085The functor of \Cref{ch:replicator} explains the difference.1086 1087\begin{proposition}[Names and individuals]\label{prop:names}1088\Sob1089\begin{enumerate}[label=(\alph*)]1090\item Every imitative protocol $\rho_{ij}=x_j\,r(\pi_i,\pi_j)$ has a mean dynamic that is natural for all1091payoff-preserving maps: faces are invariant and clones lump, exactly as in \Cref{cor:three}.1092\item A dynamic that is natural for subgame inclusions leaves every face invariant, so every pure state is a1093rest point. In any game with a pure state that is not a Nash equilibrium it violates Nash stationarity and1094Innovation.1095\item The Brown--von Neumann--Nash and Smith dynamics are natural for symmetries and for neither of the other1096two generating cases of \Cref{def:map}: an absent strategy can appear, and duplicating a strategy changes the1097motion of the class totals. \chk{O7}1098\end{enumerate}1099\end{proposition}1100\begin{proof}1101(a) The mean dynamic is $\dot x_i=x_i\sum_jx_j\bigl(r(\pi_j,\pi_i)-r(\pi_i,\pi_j)\bigr)$. The factor $x_i$ gives1102invariance of faces, and the sum depends on $x$ only through the distribution of payoffs, which is unchanged1103when clones are merged. (b) is immediate from the definitions. (c) In both protocols the inflow into strategy1104$i$ does not carry the factor $x_i$. A strategy with two names receives the inflow twice: for1105Rock--Paper--Scissors with Rock duplicated the discrepancy between the pushed-forward field and the field of1106the quotient game reached $0.56$ for Smith and $0.38$ for Brown--von Neumann--Nash over fifty random states.1107\end{proof}1108 1109\begin{remark}1110Imitation counts individuals; a direct protocol counts names. Under imitation a strategy is as visible as it1111is common, so a twin of a strategy that exists is invisible as a separate thing, and a dominated twin dies at1112the rate of its penalty. Under a direct protocol every name is a candidate at every moment whatever its1113frequency, so a twin is a second target for switching, and it is replenished each time the cycle makes it1114nearly optimal. \Cref{thm:hs} is the price of Nash stationarity: one cannot have both the invariance of1115\Cref{thm:natural} and rest points that are exactly the Nash equilibria.1116\end{remark}1117 1118\section{Populations as open systems}1119 1120In \eqref{eq:rep} the game and the learning rule are fused. They can be separated.1121 1122\begin{definition}1123A \term{population box} on $S$ is an open dynamical system with input a payoff vector $\pi\in\R^S$, state1124$x\in\Dist(S)$, output the state, and dynamics $\dot x=V(x,\pi)$. The \term{replicator box} has1125$V_i=x_i(\pi_i-x\cdot\pi)$.1126\end{definition}1127 1128\begin{proposition}[The replicator box integrates and normalizes]\label{prop:softmax}1129\Scl For any integrable input $\pi(\cdot)$ and interior initial state, the replicator box has the solution1130\[ x(t)=\operatorname{softmax}\Bigl(\log x(0)+\int_0^t\pi(\tau)\,d\tau\Bigr). \]1131In the coordinates $z=\log x$ modulo constants the box is the integrator $\dot z=\pi$. \chk{O6}1132\end{proposition}1133 1134\noindent All the nonlinearity of the replicator equation is in the game and in the readout, the map1135$\operatorname{softmax}$ from $\R^S/\R\one$ onto the open simplex; the box itself is linear. The Lyapunov function of \Cref{thm:kl} is1136the Bregman divergence of the convex function whose gradient is this readout.1137 1138A game is then a way of closing boxes.1139\begin{center}1140\begin{tikzpicture}[>=stealth,scale=0.95,every node/.style={font=\small}]1141\node[draw,thick,minimum width=1.9cm,minimum height=0.9cm] (p) at (0,0) {population};1142\node[draw,minimum width=1cm,minimum height=0.7cm] (a) at (0,-1.5) {$A$};1143\draw[->] (p.east) -- ++(0.8,0) |- node[pos=0.25,right]{$x$} (a.east);1144\draw[->] (a.west) -- ++(-1.25,0) |- node[pos=0.25,left]{$\pi=Ax$} (p.west);1145\node at (0,-2.4) {one population};1146\begin{scope}[xshift=6.3cm]1147\node[draw,thick,minimum width=1.5cm,minimum height=0.9cm] (r) at (-1.6,0) {row};1148\node[draw,thick,minimum width=1.5cm,minimum height=0.9cm] (c) at (1.6,0) {column};1149\node[draw,minimum width=0.9cm,minimum height=0.7cm] (a2) at (0,0.75) {$B^{\T}$};1150\node[draw,minimum width=0.9cm,minimum height=0.7cm] (b2) at (0,-0.75) {$A$};1151\draw[->] (r.north) |- node[pos=0.25,left]{$x$} (a2.west);1152\draw[->] (a2.east) -| (c.north);1153\draw[->] (c.south) |- node[pos=0.25,right]{$y$} (b2.east);1154\draw[->] (b2.west) -| (r.south);1155\node at (0,-2.4) {two populations};1156\end{scope}