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evolutionary-game-theory-in-higher-categories.tex
Source for Evolutionary Game Theory in Higher Categories
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61 \fancyhf{}%62 \fancyfoot[R]{\sffamily\small\color{bookmuted}\thepage}%63 \renewcommand{\headrulewidth}{0pt}%64}65 66\theoremstyle{plain}67\newtheorem{theorem}{Theorem}[chapter]68\newtheorem{proposition}[theorem]{Proposition}69\newtheorem{lemma}[theorem]{Lemma}70\newtheorem{corollary}[theorem]{Corollary}71\theoremstyle{definition}72\newtheorem{definition}[theorem]{Definition}73\newtheorem{example}[theorem]{Example}74\theoremstyle{remark}75\newtheorem{remark}[theorem]{Remark}76 77\DeclareMathOperator{\Hom}{Hom}78\DeclareMathOperator{\Ob}{Ob}79\DeclareMathOperator{\id}{id}80\DeclareMathOperator{\Id}{Id}81\DeclareMathOperator{\Nat}{Nat}82\newcommand{\Set}{\mathbf{Set}}83\newcommand{\FinSet}{\mathbf{FinSet}}84\newcommand{\Cat}{\mathcal{C}}85 86\setcounter{tocdepth}{1}87\DeclareMathOperator{\tr}{tr}88\DeclareMathOperator{\Tr}{Tr}89\DeclareMathOperator{\Ad}{Ad}90\DeclareMathOperator{\Map}{Map}91\DeclareMathOperator{\Tor}{Tor}92\DeclareMathOperator{\Ext}{Ext}93\DeclareMathOperator{\Rep}{Rep}94\DeclareMathOperator{\End}{End}95 96\newcommand{\hrepPart}{}97\newcommand{\bookpart}[2]{%98 \addtocontents{toc}{\protect\hrepPartEntry{#1}{#2}}%99 \gdef\hrepPart{{\sffamily\small\color{bookaccent}Part #1\enspace #2\par\vspace{12pt}}}}100\newcommand{\hrepPartEntry}[2]{%101 \Needspace{6\baselineskip}%102 \par\addvspace{0.7\baselineskip}%103 \noindent\textcolor{bookaccent}{\textbf{#1\enspace #2}}\par\nopagebreak[4]}104\titleformat{\chapter}[display]105 {\normalfont\huge\bfseries\raggedright}106 {\hrepPart\sffamily\small\bfseries\color{bookaccent}\MakeUppercase{\chaptertitlename}\ \thechapter}107 {8pt}{}108 [\global\let\hrepPart\empty\vspace{4pt}{\color{bookrule}\titlerule}]109 110\begin{document}111\frontmatter112\begin{titlepage}113 \thispagestyle{empty}114 \vspace*{0.16\textheight}115 {\noindent\color{bookaccent}\rule{\textwidth}{1pt}\par}116 \vspace{17pt}117 {\fontsize{27}{34}\selectfont\bfseries\raggedright118 Evolutionary Game Theory\\in Higher Categories\par}119 \vspace{14pt}120 {\noindent\Large Stability, stochastic selection,\\and compositional models\par}121 \vspace{30pt}122 {\noindent\large Anonymous\par}123 \vfill124 {\noindent\small November 2026\par}125\end{titlepage}126 127\tableofcontents128\mainmatter129 130\bookpart{I}{Fitness, invasion, and stability}131\chapter{Population states and payoff maps}132\label{ch:population}133 134Evolutionary game theory uses a payoff comparison to describe how the135composition of a population changes the prospects of its members. The136state of a population is a distribution of strategic types. The same137set of types can support many different models, since changing the138matching process or the rule for converting payoffs to growth can139change the resulting dynamics. This chapter isolates the distribution140and payoff operations used in the pairwise, randomly matched model141\cite[Chs.~1--2]{alexander}.142 143\section{Distributions and relabeling}144 145For a nonempty finite set \(I\) of types, the population state space is146the simplex147\[148 \Delta(I)=\left\{x\in\mathbb R^I:149 x_i\geq0,\quad \sum_{i\in I}x_i=1\right\}.150\]151Write \(\delta_i\) for the state concentrated on \(i\).152The support of \(x\) is the set of its positive coordinates.153For a nonempty subset \(S\subseteq I\), the inclusion154\(\Delta(S)\to\Delta(I)\) inserts zero in the omitted coordinates.155Its image is a face, and its relative interior consists precisely156of the states of support \(S\). The affine hull of the full simplex157is the hyperplane \(\sum_i x_i=1\), whose translation space is158\(T_I=\{v:\sum_i v_i=0\}\). Feasible directions at a boundary state159are those \(v\in T_I\) with \(v_i\geq0\) whenever \(x_i=0\).160Indeed, this is necessary for \(x+t v\) to have nonnegative