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evolutionary-game-theory-in-higher-categories.tex

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701solution in a parameter family.702 703\section{A local margin and continuation on a face}704 705The compact-direction argument yields a useful quantitative706version. If \(p\) is an ESS and the feasible unit set is707nonempty, there are constants \(c,\delta>0\) such that708\[709 u_A(p,x)-u_A(x,x)\ \geq\ c\|x-p\|^2710 \qquad(\|x-p\|<\delta).711\]712Indeed, if the critical unit set is nonempty, choose \(a>0\)713with \(Q_A\leq-a\) there. On the directions where714\(Q_A<-a/2\), the difference at \(v=rw\) is at least715\((a/2)r^2\). On the closed complement the minimum of716\(L_p\) is some \(m>0\). For717\(r<\min\{1,m/(2(1+M))\}\), the difference is at least718\((m/2)r\geq(m/2)r^2\). If either region is empty only719the other bound is needed. When the critical unit set720is empty the second estimate applies on all directions.721The lower bound is an estimate on payoffs. Its use722as an estimate on motion requires a dynamics whose723drift is related to those payoffs.724 725At a Nash point, let \(B_p=\{i:(Ap)_i=M_p\}\), where726\(M_p=\max_i(Ap)_i\). Since \(\sum_i v_i=0\), one has727\[728 L_p(v)=\sum_{i\notin B_p}\bigl(M_p-(Ap)_i\bigr)v_i .729\]730All terms on the right are nonnegative for feasible731directions because every omitted index has zero weight732in \(p\). Consequently \(v\in K_p\) precisely when733\(v\in C_p\) and \(v_i=0\) outside \(B_p\).734If every absent type has a strictly lower payoff,735then \(B_p=\operatorname{supp}(p)=S\). The critical736cone is simply the tangent space to \(\Delta(S)\).737An ESS of this kind with a strict quadratic test on that738tangent space persists on the same face under small739matrix perturbations: solve the interior equation for740the restricted matrix, extend by zero, and use continuity741to preserve the payoff gaps to all absent types.742Any Nash state sufficiently near \(p\) for a sufficiently743small perturbation still has positive coordinates on744\(S\), and the same payoff gaps prevent extra positive745coordinates outside \(S\). Its uniqueness therefore follows746from the restricted affine equation. Here the strict gaps747and the curvature on the face control different aspects of748the same continuation.749\par750\chapter{Payoff equivalence and spaces of games}751\label{ch:payoff-equivalence}752 753The payoff array contains information about the absolute score754of each encounter. The static comparisons in Chapter~\ref{ch:ess}755and the usual replicator field use only relative scores against756the same population. This difference suggests an equivalence757relation on games with fixed type labels. Once labels are also758allowed to vary, the resulting space of games has a groupoid759presentation. Its arrows identify numerical presentations of760the same relative-fitness model.761 762\section{The quotient by common fitness increments}763 764Fix a nonempty finite type set \(I\), put \(n=|I|\), and765write \(\mathbf 1\) for its constant vector. Let766\[767 \mathcal A_I=\operatorname{End}(\mathbb R^I),768 \qquad W_I=\{\mathbf 1 b^{\mathsf T}:b\in\mathbb R^I\}.769\]770If \(B=A+\mathbf 1 b^{\mathsf T}\), then771\[772 Bx=Ax+(b^{\mathsf T}x)\mathbf 1 .773\]774The increment is common to every row type, though its775size can depend on the opponent distribution \(x\).776For \(p,q,x\) in the simplex we have777\((p-q)^{\mathsf T}(B-A)x=0\), since \(p,q\) have the778same total mass. Thus comparing \(p\) and \(q\) against779\(x\) gives identical advantage in the two games.780This includes both comparisons in the ESS test.781 782Define the zero-mean projection783\(\Pi_I v=v-\mathbf 1(\sum_i v_i)/n\). Its kernel784is the span of \(\mathbf 1\) and its image is \(T_I\).785The map \(A\mapsto\Pi_I A\) has kernel \(W_I\):786each column is killed precisely when that column is787constant across the rows. It maps onto the linear maps788\(\mathbb R^I\to T_I\), since the projection acts789as the identity on their image. It follows that790\[791 \mathcal Q_I=\mathcal A_I/W_I792          \simeq\operatorname{Hom}(\mathbb R^I,T_I).793\]794Each class has a canonical representative with zero795column sums. Alternatively, knowing the relative scores796against every population state determines this class.797Indeed the relative scores give all row differences798in \((A-B)x\). If these vanish for all \(x\), evaluation799at each pure state shows \(A-B\in W_I\).800