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evolutionary-game-theory-in-higher-categories.tex
Source for Evolutionary Game Theory in Higher Categories
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49\titlespacing*{\section}{0pt}{15pt plus 2pt minus 1pt}{6pt}50\titleformat{\subsection}{\large\bfseries\raggedright}51 {\color{bookaccent}\thesubsection}{0.65em}{}52\captionsetup{font=small,labelfont={bf,color=bookaccent},skip=6pt}53 54\pagestyle{fancy}55\fancyhf{}56\fancyhead[L]{\small\color{bookmuted}\nouppercase{\leftmark}}57\fancyfoot[R]{\sffamily\small\color{bookmuted}\thepage}58\renewcommand{\headrulewidth}{0pt}59\renewcommand{\chaptermark}[1]{\markboth{#1}{}}60\fancypagestyle{plain}{%61 \fancyhf{}%62 \fancyfoot[R]{\sffamily\small\color{bookmuted}\thepage}%63 \renewcommand{\headrulewidth}{0pt}%64}65 66\theoremstyle{plain}67\newtheorem{theorem}{Theorem}[chapter]68\newtheorem{proposition}[theorem]{Proposition}69\newtheorem{lemma}[theorem]{Lemma}70\newtheorem{corollary}[theorem]{Corollary}71\theoremstyle{definition}72\newtheorem{definition}[theorem]{Definition}73\newtheorem{example}[theorem]{Example}74\theoremstyle{remark}75\newtheorem{remark}[theorem]{Remark}76 77\DeclareMathOperator{\Hom}{Hom}78\DeclareMathOperator{\Ob}{Ob}79\DeclareMathOperator{\id}{id}80\DeclareMathOperator{\Id}{Id}81\DeclareMathOperator{\Nat}{Nat}82\newcommand{\Set}{\mathbf{Set}}83\newcommand{\FinSet}{\mathbf{FinSet}}84\newcommand{\Cat}{\mathcal{C}}85 86\setcounter{tocdepth}{1}87\DeclareMathOperator{\tr}{tr}88\DeclareMathOperator{\Tr}{Tr}89\DeclareMathOperator{\Ad}{Ad}90\DeclareMathOperator{\Map}{Map}91\DeclareMathOperator{\Tor}{Tor}92\DeclareMathOperator{\Ext}{Ext}93\DeclareMathOperator{\Rep}{Rep}94\DeclareMathOperator{\End}{End}95 96\newcommand{\hrepPart}{}97\newcommand{\bookpart}[2]{%98 \addtocontents{toc}{\protect\hrepPartEntry{#1}{#2}}%99 \gdef\hrepPart{{\sffamily\small\color{bookaccent}Part #1\enspace #2\par\vspace{12pt}}}}100\newcommand{\hrepPartEntry}[2]{%101 \Needspace{6\baselineskip}%102 \par\addvspace{0.7\baselineskip}%103 \noindent\textcolor{bookaccent}{\textbf{#1\enspace #2}}\par\nopagebreak[4]}104\titleformat{\chapter}[display]105 {\normalfont\huge\bfseries\raggedright}106 {\hrepPart\sffamily\small\bfseries\color{bookaccent}\MakeUppercase{\chaptertitlename}\ \thechapter}107 {8pt}{}108 [\global\let\hrepPart\empty\vspace{4pt}{\color{bookrule}\titlerule}]109 110\begin{document}111\frontmatter112\begin{titlepage}113 \thispagestyle{empty}114 \vspace*{0.16\textheight}115 {\noindent\color{bookaccent}\rule{\textwidth}{1pt}\par}116 \vspace{17pt}117 {\fontsize{27}{34}\selectfont\bfseries\raggedright118 Evolutionary Game Theory\\in Higher Categories\par}119 \vspace{14pt}120 {\noindent\Large Stability, stochastic selection,\\and compositional models\par}121 \vspace{30pt}122 {\noindent\large Anonymous\par}123 \vfill124 {\noindent\small November 2026\par}125\end{titlepage}126 127\tableofcontents128\mainmatter129 130\bookpart{I}{Fitness, invasion, and stability}131\chapter{Population states and payoff maps}132\label{ch:population}133 134Evolutionary game theory uses a payoff comparison to describe how the135composition of a population changes the prospects of its members. The136state of a population is a distribution of strategic types. The same137set of types can support many different models, since changing the138matching process or the rule for converting payoffs to growth can139change the resulting dynamics. This chapter isolates the distribution140and payoff operations used in the pairwise, randomly matched model141\cite[Chs.~1--2]{alexander}.142 143\section{Distributions and relabeling}144 145For a nonempty finite set \(I\) of types, the population state space is146the simplex147\[148 \Delta(I)=\left\{x\in\mathbb R^I: