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evolutionary-game-theory-in-higher-categories.tex
Source for Evolutionary Game Theory in Higher Categories
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409positive \(\varepsilon\), continuity gives \(d_0\geq0\).410When \(d_0=0\), the same interval condition requires411\(d_1>0\) by the displayed identity. Conversely, if412\(d_0>0\), the advantage remains positive for all413sufficiently small \(\varepsilon\) by continuity. If414\(d_0=0\) and \(d_1>0\), the advantage is415\(\varepsilon d_1>0\) throughout the range of positive416mutant shares. Applying the argument to every \(q\ne p\)417gives the equivalence.418\end{proof}419 420The two terms are evaluated in different environments.421The first evaluates both strategies against a purely422resident population. The second evaluates both against423the competing strategy. In the event of a first-order424tie, the strictly positive second comparison explains425why the resident gains a strict advantage when a426positive mutant share is present. Every strict symmetric427Nash equilibrium is evolutionarily stable, since none428of its competitors ties in the first comparison.429 430For a general continuous fitness map the first comparison431still gives a necessary condition for positive advantage432near zero mutant share. The exact tie test in433Theorem~\ref{thm:invasion-criterion} uses affine dependence434on the population. With nonlinear dependence, the advantage435along the segment can have a nontrivial shape. An endpoint436comparison then requires additional hypotheses before it437determines the sign near the resident.438 439\section{Neutral stability and sets of solutions}440 441Neutral stability uses the weak inequality442\(D_{p,q}(\varepsilon)\geq0\) in the invasion test. This443standard variant allows a competing strategy to match the444resident's score when its share is small445\cite[Ch.~2]{weibull}. The same proof, with a weak inequality446on the tie condition, shows that \(p\) is neutrally stable447exactly when it is symmetric Nash and \(d_1\geq0\) for each448distinct \(q\) with \(d_0=0\). Thus the solution predicates449satisfy450\[451 \operatorname{ESS}(A)\subseteq452 \operatorname{NS}(A)\subseteq453 \operatorname{Nash}(A).454\]455These are subsets of the state space. An equality between456local payoffs in the invasion test need not select one457of the tied states. Persistence or attraction of the458resident depends on the dynamics chosen to resolve or459retain such ties.460 461The symmetric Nash condition defines a closed relation462between payoff matrices and population states. Indeed,463for each fixed pure type \(i\) it is the nonnegativity464of the continuous difference \(u_A(p,p)-(Ap)_i\), and465the pure inequalities imply the conditions for all466mixtures by averaging. An evolutionary stability467relation adds a conditional strict inequality. For468instance, along the parameter ray \(A(t)=tA\) for469\(t>0\), all comparisons in470Theorem~\ref{thm:invasion-criterion} retain their sign.471At \(t=0\) all comparisons vanish. If the simplex has472more than one point, every resident is then neutral and473no resident is strictly evolutionarily stable. Whenever474the positive ray has an ESS this supplies a limiting475failure of strict stability. Thus a family of games476with a continuous payoff map may have different solution477fibers at limiting parameter values.478 479\section{Transporting the comparison}480 481A label change transports all these predicates. To see482this, apply a payoff-preserving bijection \(f:(I,A)\to(J,B)\).483The map \(f_*\) respects the mixture \(x_\varepsilon\) by484affinity and preserves its payoff by485Proposition~\ref{prop:exact-fitness}. It also gives a486bijection between the competitors of \(p\) and of \(f_*p\).487The inequalities and their quantifiers therefore agree.488For a family with label transitions the stable locus489can be described on each chart and glued as a subset490of the simplex family by this argument. It retains491the topology inherited from that family when the492payoffs vary in a topological base.493 494For a payoff-preserving surjection \(f\), the Nash495predicate obeys the same comparison, since every496competitor of \(f_*p\) can be lifted. Strict stability497has an additional obstruction. If \(q\ne p\) has498\(f_*q=f_*p\), the payoff identity makes499\(D_{p,q}(\varepsilon)=0\) for every share. The lifted500matrix can thus preserve all coarse payoff information501and have additional tied alternatives upstairs. This502is one reason to record the class of game maps before503using it to compare solution sets.504 505\section{A population formulation of best replies}506 507The Nash relation has a useful description by the subset508of types with maximal score. Let \(B\subseteq I\) be