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evolutionary-game-theory-in-higher-categories.tex
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3821\[3822 S(x,w)_i-x_i3823 =\frac{\eta}{1+\eta\mu_x(u)}F(x,u)_i .3824\]3825No time limit is needed to obtain this equality.3826 3827\section{Deterministic aggregation}3828 3829For a map $q:I\to J$, the Lean definition of aggregation is3830$(q_*x)_j=\sum_{q(i)=j}x_i$. The project proves preservation of mass3831and of simplex membership, functoriality under composition, and the3832pullback-pushforward pairing3833\[3834 \mu_x(v\circ q)=\mu_{q_*x}(v).3835\]3836For $v:J\to R$ it proves the two commutation identities3837\[3838 q_*F(x,v\circ q)=F(q_*x,v),\qquad3839 q_*S(x,v\circ q)=S(q_*x,v).3840\]3841A state-dependent form and a specialization to pullbacks of payoff3842matrices make the first equation applicable to the deterministic3843semiconjugacy of Chapter~\ref{ch:semiconjugacy}. Each result uses3844finite sums and function extensionality. The second identity is3845algebraic as an equality of field terms. Its population interpretation3846uses the nonzero normalizer as in the preceding section.3847 3848\section{Reproducing the check}3849 3850From the extracted Lean source, run \texttt{lake exe cache get},3851\texttt{lake build}, and \texttt{lake env lean Audit.lean}.3852The manifest pins the mathlib revision. The last command prints3853the transitive axioms of the audited declarations. The supplied audit3854records standard Lean axioms and no admitted proofs. The appendix3855covers the algebraic vector field and reproductive update. The main3856text gives the analytical and higher-categorical arguments, including3857existence of flows, stochastic limits, and the channel covariance3858formula in Chapter~\ref{ch:stochastic-compression}.3859\chapter{Subject index}3860\label{app:index}3861\small3862\setlength{\parskip}{0pt}3863\noindent References give the chapters or appendices where each term is developed.3864\smallskip3865\begin{multicols}{2}\raggedright3866\begin{description}[leftmargin=0pt,labelindent=0pt,itemsep=.10\baselineskip]3867\item[Aggregation] \ref{ch:aggregation}, \ref{ch:semiconjugacy}, \ref{ch:stochastic-compression}.3868\item[Assortative interaction] \ref{ch:structured}.3869\item[Best response] \ref{ch:revision}.3870\item[Coarse correlated equilibrium] \ref{ch:agent-learning}.3871\item[Context] \ref{ch:contextual-games}, \ref{ch:higher-equivariance}.3872\item[Continuation] \ref{ch:open-games}, \ref{ch:compositional-games}.3873\item[Coplay] \ref{ch:open-games}.3874\item[Covariance defect] \ref{ch:stochastic-compression}.3875\item[Descent] \ref{ch:contextual-games}, \ref{ch:higher-equivariance}.3876\item[Equilibria] \ref{ch:ess}, \ref{ch:higher-equivariance}.3877\item[Evolutionarily stable strategy] \ref{ch:ess}, \ref{ch:superiority}, \ref{ch:lyapunov}.3878\item[Exponential weights] \ref{ch:agent-learning}.3879\item[Finite populations] \ref{ch:markov}, \ref{ch:mean-field}.3880\item[Fitness] \ref{ch:population}, \ref{ch:payoff-equivalence}.3881\item[Formalization] \ref{app:formalization}.3882\item[Homotopy quotient] \ref{ch:higher-equivariance}.3883\item[Invasion] \ref{ch:ess}, \ref{ch:superiority}.3884\item[Lens] \ref{ch:open-games}.3885\item[Logit dynamics] \ref{ch:revision}.3886\item[Lumpability] \ref{ch:aggregation}.3887\item[Lyapunov functions] \ref{ch:lyapunov}.3888\item[Markov kernel] \ref{ch:markov}, \ref{ch:aggregation}.3889\item[Mass action] \ref{ch:open-dynamics}.3890\item[Mean-field limit] \ref{ch:mean-field}.3891\item[Monodromy] \ref{ch:contextual-games}.3892\item[Multipopulation dynamics] \ref{ch:structured}.3893\item[Mutation] \ref{ch:replicator}, \ref{ch:stochastic-stability}.3894\item[Open dynamics] \ref{ch:open-dynamics}.3895\item[Open game] \ref{ch:open-games}, \ref{ch:compositional-games}.3896\item[Payoff shift] \ref{ch:payoff-equivalence}, \ref{ch:agent-learning}.3897\item[Pushout gluing] \ref{ch:open-dynamics}.3898\item[Regret] \ref{ch:agent-learning}.3899\item[Revision protocol] \ref{ch:revision}, \ref{ch:compositional-games}.3900\item[Replicator equation] \ref{ch:replicator}, \ref{ch:lyapunov}.3901\item[Semiconjugacy] \ref{ch:semiconjugacy}, \ref{ch:stochastic-compression}.3902\item[Shahshahani metric] \ref{ch:lyapunov}, \ref{ch:stochastic-compression}.3903\item[Stochastic stability] \ref{ch:stochastic-stability}.3904\item[Support face] \ref{ch:population}, \ref{ch:replicator}.3905\item[Symmetry] \ref{ch:contextual-games}, \ref{ch:higher-equivariance}.3906\end{description}3907\end{multicols}3908\backmatter3909\begin{thebibliography}{99}3910\addcontentsline{toc}{chapter}{Bibliography}3911\small\raggedright3912\setlength{\itemsep}{0pt}\setlength{\parsep}{0pt}\setlength{\parskip}{0pt}3913\setlength{\baselineskip}{11.5pt}3914\bibitem{alexander} J. McKenzie Alexander. \emph{Evolutionary Game Theory}. Elements in Decision Theory and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 2023. \href{https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108582063}{doi:10.1017/9781108582063}.3915\bibitem{weibull} J. W. Weibull. \emph{Evolutionary Game Theory}. MIT Press, 1995. \href{https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262231817/evolutionary-game-theory/}{Publisher}.3916\bibitem{maynard-price} J. Maynard Smith and G. R. Price. The logic of animal conflict. \emph{Nature} 246 (1973), 15--18. \href{https://doi.org/10.1038/246015a0}{doi:10.1038/246015a0}.3917\bibitem{taylor-jonker} P. D. Taylor and L. B. Jonker. Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics. \emph{Mathematical Biosciences} 40 (1978), 145--156. \href{https://doi.org/10.1016/0025-5564(78)90077-9}{doi:10.1016/0025-5564(78)90077-9}.3918\bibitem{hofbauer-schuster-sigmund} J. Hofbauer, P. Schuster, and K. Sigmund. A note on evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics. \emph{Journal of Theoretical Biology} 81 (1979), 609--612. \href{https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-5193(79)90058-4}{doi:10.1016/0022-5193(79)90058-4}.3919\bibitem{hofbauer-sigmund} J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund. \emph{Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics}. Cambridge University Press, 1998. \href{https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173179}{doi:10.1017/CBO9781139173179}.3920\bibitem{shahshahani} S. Shahshahani. \emph{A New Mathematical Framework for the Study of Linkage and Selection}. Memoirs of the AMS 17, no.~211 (1979). \href{https://doi.org/10.1090/memo/0211}{doi:10.1090/memo/0211}.