Independent scholarship · Open accessThe monthly digest

Indexed text attachment

evolutionary-game-theory-in-higher-categories.tex

Source for Evolutionary Game Theory in Higher Categories

View paper · Download original file

Lines 3681–3780 of 3949. Source text is displayed literally.

3681product law $\nu_t$. If player $i$ receives the payoff3682vector of expected utilities of each of its possible3683actions against the other players' current choices of3684distributions, its payoff under its own distribution is3685$\mathbb E_{\nu_t}u_i(a)$. Its payoff from a fixed unilateral3686deviation $b_i$ is3687$\mathbb E_{\nu_t}u_i(b_i,a_{-i})$. Set3688$\overline\nu_T=T^{-1}\sum_t\nu_t$. Then the coarse3689correlated equilibrium inequalities take the form3690\[3691 \mathbb E_{\overline\nu_T}3692       [u_i(b_i,a_{-i})-u_i(a)]3693         \leq \frac{\operatorname{Regret}_i(T)}{T}3694\]3695for every $i,b_i$, with regret defined as the maximum3696over the fixed deviations (or a bound on that maximum).3697This is obtained by adding the per-round deviations.3698When these bounds tend to zero every accumulation point3699of the averaged joint laws is a coarse correlated3700equilibrium, by continuity of the finitely many linear3701inequalities. The conclusion concerns joint laws, which3702can carry correlation through their common time index.3703A Nash statement on the last product distribution3704would require other hypotheses. This distinction is3705important in agent populations whose behavior continues3706to cycle or react to changing opponents.3707 3708\section{Outer selection and the evaluation interface}3709 3710A program strategy can be represented by a fixed artifact,3711with an evaluation map from its identity and the current3712context to a score. The test distribution, budget,3713counterfactual comparison class, and timing determine3714whether the score estimates the intended fitness.3715An inner process can generate or train candidate3716artifacts. An outer process can then keep a distribution3717over verified candidates and update that distribution using3718scores. Exponential weights keeps the distribution in the3719simplex and is insensitive to score shifts common to3720all candidates in a round. These facts are properties of3721the update. They alone say nothing about the behavior3722or validity of any candidate.3723 3724There is also a compositional concern. If an evaluator3725reports the same payoff for every strategy in a coarse3726fiber, deterministic aggregation can commute with3727selection. If it reports only a randomized label, the3728calculation of Chapter~\ref{ch:stochastic-compression}3729identifies a covariance defect even when the fine3730payoffs are conditional expectations of coarse3731scores. This gives a test of a proposed reporting3732interface before using it as a summary of population3733behavior. Delayed reports, context changes, or3734evaluation mismatch introduce separate errors. A3735learning guarantee is conditional on specifying3736those mechanisms and bounding their effect.3737 3738The constructions in the book put equilibrium,3739dynamics, stochastic modeling, and presentation3740changes into compatible types. A model of interacting3741agents adds an interpretation of strategies and a3742mechanism for producing scores at the chosen interface.3743The resulting learning statements remain relative3744to that mechanism.3745\par3746 3747\appendix3748\chapter{Notation}3749\label{app:notation}3750\small\raggedright3751\setlength{\parskip}{0pt}3752\begin{description}[leftmargin=2em,style=nextline,itemsep=.31\baselineskip]3753\item[$I$, $\Delta(I)$, $x_i$] Type set, its probability simplex,3754  and mass assigned to type $i$. See Chapter~\ref{ch:population}.3755\item[$f(x)$, $\langle x,f(x)\rangle$] The current fitness vector3756  and its mean under $x$.3757\item[$R_f(x)$, $M(x)$] The replicator field and the matrix3758  $\operatorname{diag}(x)-xx^\top$ that converts a payoff3759  covector into a selection direction. See Chapters~\ref{ch:replicator}3760  and~\ref{ch:stochastic-compression}.3761\item[$D(p\Vert x)$] Relative entropy of a comparator $p$ from3762  the state $x$, finite when the support of $p$ is contained in3763  that of $x$. See Chapters~\ref{ch:lyapunov} and~\ref{ch:agent-learning}.3764\item[$\operatorname{supp}(x)$] The types with positive mass in $x$.3765  The associated support face contains trajectories from $x$ for3766  the replicator field without mutation.3767\item[$P$, $Q$] In stochastic chapters, transition kernels or3768  generator matrices with conventions specified at their use.3769  In parametrized games, $P$ can also denote a parameter object.3770\item[$A^\top$, $C_A(x)$] The pullback of payoff vectors along3771  a column-stochastic channel $A$, and its conditional covariance3772  $\operatorname{diag}(Ax)-A\operatorname{diag}(x)A^\top$.3773  See Chapter~\ref{ch:stochastic-compression}.3774\item[$(X,S)$, $(Y,R)$] Forward and backward types of an open-game3775  interface. See Chapter~\ref{ch:open-games}.3776\item[$\mathcal E_{/B}$, $P\times_B X$]3777  The slice over a context object $B$ and its fiber product.3778  See Chapter~\ref{ch:contextual-games}.3779\item[$BG$, $X//G$] The delooping of an internal group object and3780  the homotopy quotient of a $G$-object. See Chapter~\ref{ch:higher-equivariance}.