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evolutionary-game-theory-in-higher-categories.tex
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3349fitness pullbacks compose without defect. This yields a3350class of morphisms of selection systems. The same category3351of stochastic maps can be used for compression with a3352nonzero defect. In that case the formula identifies the3353specific obstruction to the map being a morphism of3354replicator dynamics.3355 3356\section{Trajectory error on a bounded time interval}3357 3358Write $x(t)$ for the fine solution and $z(t)$ for the3359coarse solution starting at $Ax(0)$. Suppose both remain3360on their simplices and that $R_g$ is Lipschitz there with3361constant $L$ for a fixed norm. Define3362$c_t=C_A(x(t))g(Ax(t))$. The projected fine solution3363satisfies3364\[3365 \frac{d}{dt}Ax(t)=R_g(Ax(t))-c_t .3366\]3367Subtracting the coarse equation and applying the3368integral form of Gr\"onwall's inequality yields3369\[3370 \|Ax(t)-z(t)\|3371 \leq\int_0^t e^{L(t-s)}\|c_s\|\,ds .3372\]3373One derivation is to integrate the difference of the3374two derivatives, bound the target field difference by3375$L\|Ax-z\|$, and iterate the resulting integral inequality.3376Its Volterra series sums to the displayed exponential.3377If the defect is identically zero, uniqueness gives exact3378semiconjugacy. If the defect is merely small, the estimate3379controls finite-time approximation. It does not give a3380uniform long-time guarantee when the bound grows with $t$.3381For other mechanisms that yield semiconjugacy and3382lumpability, see Chapters~\ref{ch:aggregation}3383and~\ref{ch:semiconjugacy}.3384 3385\section{The tangent and cotangent interpretation}3386 3387On the relative interior of a simplex, the metric3388\[3389 \langle v,w\rangle_x=\sum_i \frac{v_iw_i}{x_i},3390 \qquad \sum_i v_i=\sum_i w_i=03391\]3392identifies the centered payoff covector with its3393replicator vector. In fact3394$\langle R_f(x),v\rangle_x=\sum_i f_i(x)v_i$.3395The metric is the familiar Shahshahani metric3396\cite{shahshahani}. Its inverse on covectors modulo3397constant vectors has matrix $M(x)$. If $Ax$ is on the3398boundary of the target simplex, the same construction applies3399on the relative interior of its support face, with its inverse3400metric represented in the full coordinates by zero extension.3401The difference between the target inverse metric and the3402pushforward of the source inverse metric is $C_A(x)$. The covariance is thus also the change in the3403quadratic form used to convert a payoff into a selection3404direction. This observation explains why contraction3405of information under sampling need not make evolution3406commute with sampling. The statement proved here3407uses ordinary finite-dimensional distributions and3408an exact payoff pullback, which are strong enough to3409identify the defect in closed form.3410\par3411\chapter{Action groupoids and symmetric selection}3412\label{ch:higher-equivariance}3413 3414A permutation group can act on a game by relabeling its types.3415The resulting symmetry has a fixed locus, an orbit space, and3416an action groupoid. Each answers a different question. This3417chapter puts these constructions alongside the probability3418simplex and uses them to separate symmetry of a state from3419the quotient of a family of states.3420 3421\section{The fixed simplex and equilibrium}3422 3423Let a group $G$ act by permutations of a nonempty finite set $I$, and3424suppose $f:\Delta(I)\to\mathbb R^I$ is continuous and equivariant.3425The image of $G$ in the permutation group is finite. The fixed3426simplex $\Delta(I)^G$ consists of the states with equal3427coordinates on each orbit, so it is naturally a simplex on3428the orbit set. If $p$ is fixed, $f(p)$ is also fixed. The3429replicator field and its flow preserve this fixed simplex by3430the descent calculation in Chapter~\ref{ch:contextual-games},3431whenever the field satisfies the existence and uniqueness3432hypotheses there.3433 3434There is an equilibrium in the fixed simplex under the3435given continuity hypothesis, even before choosing a3436dynamic solution.3437 3438\begin{proposition}[An invariant Nash state]3439\label{prop:symmetric-nash}3440Under these hypotheses there is a $G$-fixed $p$ such3441that $\langle y,f(p)\rangle\leq\langle p,f(p)\rangle$3442for every $y\in\Delta(I)$.3443\end{proposition}3444 3445\begin{proof}3446For any $x$ put3447$a_i(x)=\max\{f_i(x)-\langle x,f(x)\rangle,0\}$ and3448$s(x)=\sum_i a_i(x)$. The continuous map