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evolutionary-game-theory-in-higher-categories.tex
Source for Evolutionary Game Theory in Higher Categories
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209while the population average is \(\overline u_A(x)=x^{\mathsf T}Ax\).210A correlated matching prescription instead supplies a conditional211distribution of opponents for each row type. If these distributions212are \(q(i,x)\), the corresponding fitness is213\(F_i(x)=\sum_j A_{ij}q(i,x)_j\). General matching rules214therefore need not produce a linear fitness map, even when the215encounter payoffs are fixed.216 217The pairing in \(u_A\) is functorial with respect to probability218aggregation. It uses the transpose of the aggregation map to219transport a score. For a score \(b\in\mathbb R^J\), define220\((f^*b)_i=b_{f(i)}\). Then221\[222 \sum_i x_i(f^*b)_i=\sum_j (f_*x)_j b_j.223\]224This follows by collecting the left-hand terms over each fiber of225\(f\). The formula distinguishes the direction in which226population weights move from the direction in which a fitness227score is read back.228 229\section{Exact maps between games}230 231Consider the category whose objects are pairs \((I,A)\) and whose232maps \((I,A)\to(J,B)\) are type maps \(f:I\to J\) satisfying233\(A_{ij}=B_{f(i),f(j)}\) for every \(i,j\).234Identity maps satisfy the same equation. If \(f\) and \(g\) are235payoff-preserving, the comparison for \(gf\) follows by applying236the two equalities successively. This category describes exact237games with strategy maps. There are useful coarser notions of238comparison, including maps that preserve only payoff239differences, developed in Chapter~\ref{ch:payoff-equivalence}.240 241\begin{proposition}[Fitness under exact aggregation]242\label{prop:exact-fitness}243If \(f:(I,A)\to(J,B)\) is payoff-preserving, then244\[245 Ax=f^*(Bf_*x),\qquad246 u_A(p,q)=u_B(f_*p,f_*q).247\]248Conversely, either the fitness identity at all population states249or the payoff identity at all pairs of distributions implies250payoff preservation.251\end{proposition}252 253\begin{proof}254Regroup the terms of \((Ax)_i=\sum_k B_{f(i),f(k)}x_k\)255over the fibers of \(f\). This gives the claimed fitness identity.256The identity for payoffs then follows from the pairing between257aggregation and score pullback. Conversely, evaluating the first258identity at \(\delta_j\) gives equality in each component \(i\).259Evaluating the second identity at \((\delta_i,\delta_j)\) also260gives equality of entries.261\end{proof}262 263\begin{figure}[htbp]264\centering265\[266\begin{tikzcd}[column sep=3.2em,row sep=2.4em]267 \Delta(I)\times\Delta(I)268 \arrow[r,"f_*\times f_*"]\arrow[d,"u_A"']269 & \Delta(J)\times\Delta(J)\arrow[d,"u_B"]\\270 \mathbb R\arrow[r,equal]&\mathbb R271\end{tikzcd}272\]273\caption{An exact type map commutes with expected payoff.}274\label{fig:exact-payoff-map}275\end{figure}276 277A type bijection satisfying the comparison is a change of278labels. A noninjective type map can identify distinct population279states, while a nonsurjective map may leave types of the target280unrepresented. If all target types have preimages, every281target state can be represented by lifting its mass to selected282types above its support. Such a lift need not be unique.283Expected payoff agrees for all lifts by284Proposition~\ref{prop:exact-fitness}. A selection rule using285the labels of the lifts can still see the difference. Passing286to aggregated population states must therefore be justified for287the particular rules one wants to transport.288 289\section{Parameterized populations}290 291Suppose payoffs vary continuously with an environmental292parameter \(s\) in a space \(S\), giving an array \(A(s)\).293Evaluation \((s,p,q)\mapsto u_{A(s)}(p,q)\) is continuous294by its finite-sum formula. Substituting a map \(r:S'\to S\)295pulls back the family to \(A(r(s'))\), and evaluations agree296after the same substitution. If local descriptions use different297names for the types, a transition is a bijection of the298corresponding type sets. An exact transition then gives the299comparison in Figure~\ref{fig:exact-payoff-map}, and these300comparisons compose because pushforward does. The simplex301may consequently vary as a bundle with transition maps302permuting its coordinates. Expected payoff is then a single303continuous function on pairs of states over the same parameter,304as long as the local payoff matrices obey the transition305comparisons. The groupoid of labels keeps track of both the306state and its change of presentation.307 308This setup will support two further comparisons. Static