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evolutionary-game-theory-in-higher-categories.tex
Source for Evolutionary Game Theory in Higher Categories
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2221 2222Classical evolutionary game theory starts from payoffs on an entire2223population interaction. A component description needs an interface for2224an interaction whose surroundings are still unspecified. Open games2225supply that interface in the form of an input and a continuation. The2226continuation tells the component how each possible output would be2227evaluated by its surroundings. This makes off-equilibrium choices2228available for composition \cite{ghani-open-games}.2229 2230\section{Lenses as the deterministic interface}2231 2232Use \((X,S)\) for an interface with forward type \(X\) and backward2233type \(S\). A lens from \((X,S)\) to \((Y,R)\) consists of two maps2234\[2235 v:X\to Y,\qquad u:X\times R\to S.2236\]2237Its forward action sends a state \(x\) to \(v(x)\). Its backward action2238translates a return value \(r\) using the original state \(x\). In game2239semantics a return value may contain utility information. The lens2240axioms here are the composition and identity laws for these pairs.2241 2242For a second lens \((v',u'):(Y,R)\to(Z,Q)\), the composite has forward2243map \(v'v\) and backward map2244\[2245 (x,q)\longmapsto u\bigl(x,u'(v(x),q)\bigr).2246\]2247For three lenses, both parenthesizations substitute the forward values2248in the same order and then the backward values in reverse order.2249The lens \((\operatorname{id}_X,(x,s)\mapsto s)\) is a two-sided identity.2250This gives an ordinary category. The product of two lenses uses2251cartesian products on both types and applies the two maps separately.2252 2253A continuation on the target is an arbitrary function \(k:Y\to R\).2254An input at the source is an element \(x\in X\). A lens sends an2255input forward by \(v\) and transports a continuation backward by2256\[2257 k\longmapsto \bigl(x\longmapsto u(x,k(v(x)))\bigr).2258\]2259The backward transport reverses composition by direct substitution.2260Keeping \(k\) as a function matters. A single value \(k(v(x))\) gives2261a return only at the chosen output. A component deciding whether to2262deviate may need the value at a different output.2263 2264\section{Strategies and contextual responses}2265 2266An open game \(\mathcal G:(X,S)\to(Y,R)\) consists of a strategy set2267\(\Sigma_{\mathcal G}\), a play map \(P_{\mathcal G}\), a coplay map2268\(C_{\mathcal G}\), and best-response relations:2269\[2270\begin{split}2271 P_{\mathcal G}&:\Sigma_{\mathcal G}\times X\to Y,\\2272 C_{\mathcal G}&:\Sigma_{\mathcal G}\times X\times R\to S,\\2273 B_{\mathcal G}(x,k)&\subseteq \Sigma_{\mathcal G}\times2274 \Sigma_{\mathcal G}.2275\end{split}2276\]2277Here \(k:Y\to R\). The strategies are chosen for the whole2278component. Fixing a strategy \(\sigma\) gives a lens with maps2279\(P_{\mathcal G}(\sigma,-)\) and \(C_{\mathcal G}(\sigma,-,-)\).2280A pair \((\sigma,\sigma')\in B_{\mathcal G}(x,k)\) means that2281\(\sigma'\) is an admissible response to the incumbent \(\sigma\)2282in this context. The equilibrium set consists of the strategies2283\(\sigma\) with \((\sigma,\sigma)\in B_{\mathcal G}(x,k)\).2284An open game in this generality specifies responses as data.2285Its response relation can be constructed from an optimization2286problem, a restricted revision protocol, or another stated selection2287rule \cite{ghani-open-games}.2288 2289For a decision component with observed type \(X\) and choice type2290\(Y\), take \(\Sigma=Y^X\) and \(P(\sigma,x)=\sigma(x)\). With real2291return type and backward source type \(1\), the standard maximizing2292relation allows \((\sigma,\sigma')\) if2293\[2294 k(\sigma'(x))\ \ge\ k(y)\qquad\text{for every }y\in Y.2295\]2296The map \(C\) is the unique map to \(1\). Existence of a response2297requires attainment of a maximum. At a given observed \(x\) this2298relation constrains the strategy only at \(x\). A stronger requirement2299at all possible observations needs another equilibrium test, as in2300subgame analysis. The distinction is visible in the typing of2301\(B(x,k)\).2302 2303\section{Sequential composition}2304 2305Let \(\mathcal H:(Y,R)\to(Z,Q)\) follow \(\mathcal G\), with outer2306continuation \(k:Z\to Q\). An incumbent \((\sigma,\tau)\) determines2307the intermediate forward value \(y=P_{\mathcal G}(\sigma,x)\).2308The downstream strategy determines the continuation seen upstream:2309\[2310 k_{\tau}(y')=2311 C_{\mathcal H}\bigl(\tau,y',k(P_{\mathcal H}(\tau,y'))\bigr),2312 \qquad y'\in Y.2313\]2314The upper path carries states forward. The lower arrow carries2315the continuation back across the downstream component.2316\[2317\begin{tikzcd}[column sep=large]2318 X \arrow[r,"{P_{\mathcal G}(\sigma,-)}"{above}] & Y2319 \arrow[r,"{P_{\mathcal H}(\tau,-)}"{above}] & Z\\2320 & R^Y & Q^Z \arrow[l,"k\mapsto k_\tau"{above}]