Independent scholarship · Open accessThe monthly digest

Indexed text attachment

evolutionary-game-theory-in-higher-categories.tex

Source for Evolutionary Game Theory in Higher Categories

View paper · Download original file

Lines 1681–1780 of 3949. Source text is displayed literally.

1681  F^r_W(x)=A\sum_{s\in I} W_{rs}x^s.1682\]1683Diagonal weights quantify within-population encounters. Directed weights1684allow asymmetric access to partners. The state equations apply the1685selection step within each destination of the payoff map, retaining1686separate local averages even when all populations see the same1687distribution of partners. At a stationary profile each resident type in1688each population has the same payoff. Comparison with absent types is1689required to promote this equality to a population Nash condition.1690 1691Here $W$ is part of a deterministic model posed directly at the1692population level. For an individual-based graph process, replacing, for1693example, the conditional distribution of neighbors of type $i$ by the1694unconditional population mixture is an additional modeling step.1695Ohtsuki and Nowak derive update-dependent replicator approximations for1696regular graphs using weak selection and pair1697approximation~\cite{ohtsuki-nowak}. That derivation treats local1698correlations explicitly. The present equation follows directly from the1699specified partner sampling.1700 1701\section{Exact reduction along equitable partitions}1702 1703Let $\pi\colon I\twoheadrightarrow J$ partition $I$ into blocks, and1704write $L\colon\mathcal D_J\longrightarrow\mathcal D_I$ for replication1705of block values, $(Lz)^r=z^{\pi(r)}$. The partition is equitable for1706$W$ if the total weight from $r$ to block $b$ depends only on the block1707$a=\pi(r)$. Define $\bar W_{ab}$ to be that total. This gives a row1708stochastic matrix $\bar W$ and, if $L$ also denotes the incidence matrix1709$L_{ra}=\mathbf 1_{\pi(r)=a}$, the identity $WL=L\bar W$.1710 1711\begin{proposition}1712Write $R_W$ and $R_{\bar W}$ for the replicator fields built with the1713same payoff matrix $A$. For an equitable partition, $R_W(Lz)=1714L R_{\bar W}(z)$. In particular the image of $L$ is invariant, and the1715restriction of the flow to that image is conjugate to the reduced flow.1716\end{proposition}1717 1718\begin{proof}1719For $r$ in block $a$, the expanded profile has payoff1720$F_W^r(Lz)=A\sum_b\bar W_{ab}z^b=F_{\bar W}^a(z)$. Its resident1721frequencies are $z^a$, so its local mean payoff is the same as the block1722mean payoff. Substituting those two equalities makes all derivatives1723agree with the expanded block derivatives. A reduced solution lifts to1724a full solution, which is unique from its initial condition.1725\end{proof}1726 1727For the flows $\Phi$, this reduction is an intertwining relation.1728\[1729\begin{tikzcd}[column sep=large,row sep=large]1730  \mathcal D_J \arrow[r,"\Phi_t^{\bar W}"] \arrow[d,"L"']1731    & \mathcal D_J \arrow[d,"L"] \\1732  \mathcal D_I \arrow[r,"\Phi_t^W"]1733    & \mathcal D_I1734\end{tikzcd}1735\]1736If $\bar W L'=L'\widetilde W$ for a second equitable partition,1737then $W(LL')=(LL')\widetilde W$. Thus the embeddings and their1738intertwining equations compose. The one-block partition is equitable for1739any stochastic $W$. Its synchronous dynamics is the ordinary1740replicator equation for $A$.1741 1742For a general profile, a weighted block average retains less information1743than is needed to compute its derivative. For probability weights $\mu$1744on a specified block, put $\bar x_i=\sum_r\mu_r x_i^r$ over that block1745and $h_i^r=F_i^r(x)-\phi_r(x)$. Then1746\[1747   \dot{\bar x}_i1748   =\bar x_i\sum_r\mu_r h_i^r1749    +\sum_r\mu_r(x_i^r-\bar x_i)1750                 \left(h_i^r-\sum_s\mu_s h_i^s\right).1751\]1752The second term is a covariance. Its appearance precedes any further1753attempt to express the averages of relative payoffs through the1754coarse state. Equitability controls the aggregate encounter weights,1755while the embedding supplies the synchronized state on which that1756control implies an exact closed system.1757 1758\section{A potential from detailed balance}1759 1760Suppose $W$ admits a positive probability vector $\mu$ satisfying1761$\mu_r W_{rs}=\mu_s W_{sr}$. If $A=A^{\mathsf T}$, define1762\[1763  P(x)=\frac12\sum_{r,s}\mu_r W_{rs}1764                      (x^r)^{\mathsf T}Ax^s .1765\]1766Differentiation of the first factor gives1767$\tfrac12\sum_r\mu_r\langle u^r,F_W^r(x)\rangle$.1768In the term from the second factor exchange $r$ and $s$, then apply1769detailed balance and symmetry of $A$. This gives the other half of1770$dP_x(u)=\sum_r\mu_r\langle u^r,F_W^r(x)\rangle$.1771 1772On the relative interior of each product face, give the tangent space1773the weighted product of the Shahshahani metrics from1774Chapter~\ref{ch:lyapunov}. Its inner product is1775$\sum_r\mu_r\sum_{i:x_i^r>0}u_i^r v_i^r/x_i^r$.1776For $v=R_W(x)$ the local means cancel against $\sum_i u_i^r=0$.1777Therefore $R_W$ is the gradient of $P$ in this metric. The rate of1778increase of $P$ equals the weighted sum of the within-population payoff1779variances, and vanishes at stationary profiles. This argument uses1780reciprocity of the encounter-weighted payoff couplings. A directed row