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evolutionary-game-theory-in-higher-categories.tex

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1641\label{ch:structured}1642 1643The comparison neighborhood in Chapter~\ref{ch:revision} consisted of1644individuals drawn from the same population. An individual can instead1645interact frequently with nearby populations while drawing its behavioral1646replacement from its own population. An individual who moves changes the1647composition of both the source and destination. These mechanisms give1648different equations and lead to different forms of reduction. We study1649exact synchronized subspaces for a deterministic interaction model and1650then derive a quantitative synchronization criterion for migration.1651 1652\section{Product simplices and assortative encounters}1653 1654Let $I$ be a finite set of populations and $S_r$ a finite set of types1655for each $r\in I$. A state in1656$\mathcal D_I=\prod_{r\in I}\Delta(S_r)$ records conditional1657frequencies within the populations. The payoff to type $i\in S_r$ is1658$F_i^r(x)$, potentially a function of the full profile. Local1659normalization gives1660\[1661  \phi_r(x)=\sum_{i\in S_r}x_i^r F_i^r(x),1662  \qquad1663  \dot x_i^r=x_i^r\bigl(F_i^r(x)-\phi_r(x)\bigr).1664\]1665Each population has its own conserved mass. Assuming a locally1666Lipschitz extension near the product, the proof of1667Chapter~\ref{ch:replicator} applies simultaneously. The equation for each1668population's mass receives its own continuous coefficient $\phi_r(x)$,1669and each coordinate still has an integrating factor. Compactness of the1670product yields the global flow. A choice of one face per population1671gives an invariant product face. If every $F^r$ depends solely on $x^r$,1672the flow is the product of the separate population flows. If payoffs1673couple populations, a product face can remain invariant while the flow1674within it is coupled.1675 1676Take a common type set $S$, a matrix $A$ of row-player payoffs on $S$,1677and a row stochastic matrix $W=(W_{rs})$ on $I$. An encounter by a1678resident of $r$ draws its partner's population from row $r$ and then1679draws the type from that population. The vector of expected payoffs is1680\[1681  F^r_W(x)=A\sum_{s\in I} W_{rs}x^s.1682\]1683Diagonal weights quantify within-population encounters. Directed weights1684allow asymmetric access to partners. The state equations apply the1685selection step within each destination of the payoff map, retaining1686separate local averages even when all populations see the same1687distribution of partners. At a stationary profile each resident type in1688each population has the same payoff. Comparison with absent types is1689required to promote this equality to a population Nash condition.1690 1691Here $W$ is part of a deterministic model posed directly at the1692population level. For an individual-based graph process, replacing, for1693example, the conditional distribution of neighbors of type $i$ by the1694unconditional population mixture is an additional modeling step.1695Ohtsuki and Nowak derive update-dependent replicator approximations for1696regular graphs using weak selection and pair1697approximation~\cite{ohtsuki-nowak}. That derivation treats local1698correlations explicitly. The present equation follows directly from the1699specified partner sampling.1700 1701\section{Exact reduction along equitable partitions}1702 1703Let $\pi\colon I\twoheadrightarrow J$ partition $I$ into blocks, and1704write $L\colon\mathcal D_J\longrightarrow\mathcal D_I$ for replication1705of block values, $(Lz)^r=z^{\pi(r)}$. The partition is equitable for1706$W$ if the total weight from $r$ to block $b$ depends only on the block1707$a=\pi(r)$. Define $\bar W_{ab}$ to be that total. This gives a row1708stochastic matrix $\bar W$ and, if $L$ also denotes the incidence matrix1709$L_{ra}=\mathbf 1_{\pi(r)=a}$, the identity $WL=L\bar W$.1710 1711\begin{proposition}1712Write $R_W$ and $R_{\bar W}$ for the replicator fields built with the1713same payoff matrix $A$. For an equitable partition, $R_W(Lz)=1714L R_{\bar W}(z)$. In particular the image of $L$ is invariant, and the1715restriction of the flow to that image is conjugate to the reduced flow.1716\end{proposition}1717 1718\begin{proof}1719For $r$ in block $a$, the expanded profile has payoff1720$F_W^r(Lz)=A\sum_b\bar W_{ab}z^b=F_{\bar W}^a(z)$. Its resident1721frequencies are $z^a$, so its local mean payoff is the same as the block1722mean payoff. Substituting those two equalities makes all derivatives1723agree with the expanded block derivatives. A reduced solution lifts to1724a full solution, which is unique from its initial condition.1725\end{proof}1726 1727For the flows $\Phi$, this reduction is an intertwining relation.1728\[1729\begin{tikzcd}[column sep=large,row sep=large]1730  \mathcal D_J \arrow[r,"\Phi_t^{\bar W}"] \arrow[d,"L"']1731    & \mathcal D_J \arrow[d,"L"] \\1732  \mathcal D_I \arrow[r,"\Phi_t^W"]1733    & \mathcal D_I1734\end{tikzcd}1735\]1736If $\bar W L'=L'\widetilde W$ for a second equitable partition,1737then $W(LL')=(LL')\widetilde W$. Thus the embeddings and their1738intertwining equations compose. The one-block partition is equitable for1739any stochastic $W$. Its synchronous dynamics is the ordinary1740replicator equation for $A$.