Indexed text attachment
evolutionary-game-theory-in-higher-categories.tex
Source for Evolutionary Game Theory in Higher Categories
View paper · Download original file
Lines 1461–1560 of 3949. Source text is displayed literally.
1461response at a tie. There may be several paths from the same1462initial state. A point admits a constant path exactly when1463\(x\in B(x)\), the Nash condition. Convergence results for1464this inclusion require substantial further structure.1465For instance, Hofbauer and Sorin study continuous1466concave--convex zero-sum games and identify convergence1467to the saddle-point set \cite{hofbauer-sorin}.1468 1469\section{Pairwise comparison}1470 1471Suppose a reviser currently using \(j\) switches towards1472\(i\) at rate \(\rho(F_i(x)-F_j(x))\), absorbing any common1473uniform sampling frequency into time. Let \(\rho\) be1474nonnegative and locally Lipschitz, strictly positive for1475positive arguments and zero for nonpositive arguments.1476The drift of \(x_i\) is the difference between incoming1477and outgoing flux:1478\begin{equation}1479 W_i(x)=\sum_j x_j\rho(F_i(x)-F_j(x))1480 -x_i\sum_j\rho(F_j(x)-F_i(x)).1481 \label{eq:pairwise-drift}1482\end{equation}1483Each individual transfer contributes with opposite signs1484to the two relevant coordinates. Summing therefore gives1485zero, and the rate at an absent coordinate is nonnegative.1486If \(F\) is locally Lipschitz, the incoming-term variation1487argument of Chapter~\ref{ch:replicator} shows that the1488resulting equation has a unique global forward trajectory1489from each simplex state.1490 1491\begin{proposition}[Rest states under comparison]1492A state is a rest point of \eqref{eq:pairwise-drift}1493if and only if it is Nash.1494\end{proposition}1495 1496\begin{proof}1497Reindexing the sum of the outgoing terms gives1498\[1499 F(x)\cdot W(x)=1500 \sum_{i,j} x_j\rho(F_i(x)-F_j(x))1501 (F_i(x)-F_j(x))\ge0.1502\]1503Every summand is nonnegative, and it is positive1504exactly when \(x_j>0\) and \(F_i(x)>F_j(x)\).1505At a rest point no such pair exists. Thus every used1506strategy maximizes payoff, so \(x\in B(x)\).1507Conversely, if \(x\in B(x)\), every transition away1508from a used strategy has rate zero. Both flux terms1509vanish.1510\end{proof}1511 1512This is the positive-correlation argument for pairwise1513comparison dynamics \cite{sandholm-pairwise}. It also yields1514a strict increase of the potential along nonstationary1515paths when the payoff one-form is exact. In a related1516protocol, sample the candidate from the current population1517and use \([F_i-F_j]_+=\max(F_i-F_j,0)\) as the switch1518rate conditional on the candidate. The flux from \(j\) to1519\(i\) is then \(x_j x_i[F_i-F_j]_+\).1520Combining it with its reverse flux and using1521\([a]_+-[-a]_+=a\) recovers \eqref{eq:replicator}.1522This latter sampling convention cannot create an absent1523type. The state-independent availability of candidates is1524the hypothesis that makes the preceding characterization1525include the boundary Nash inequalities.1526 1527\section{Logit revision and regularization}1528 1529Fix a noise parameter \(\eta>0\). The logit response is1530\[1531 B^\eta_i(x)=\frac{\exp(F_i(x)/\eta)}1532 {\sum_j\exp(F_j(x)/\eta)} .1533\]1534The smooth response map from fitness vectors to probabilities1535preserves common payoff baselines and is equivariant under1536strategy relabeling. For a bijection \(S\to S'\) with1537permutation map \(P\) the latter statement is1538\[1539\begin{tikzcd}[column sep=large]1540\mathbb R^S \arrow[r,"\operatorname{softmax}_{\eta}"]\arrow[d] &1541 \Delta(S)\arrow[d]\\1542\mathbb R^{S'}\arrow[r,"\operatorname{softmax}_{\eta}"]&1543 \Delta(S').1544\end{tikzcd}1545\]1546The two vertical maps apply \(P\). The result follows because1547the normalization is a sum over the strategy set. A1548many-to-one map need not commute with the same response,1549since several copied entries contribute several terms to1550that sum.1551 1552In detail, let \(q\colon S'\twoheadrightarrow S\) be a1553surjection and pull a payoff vector \(f\) back to \(f\circ q\).1554The mass assigned to the fiber of \(i\) is proportional to1555\(\lvert q^{-1}(i)\rvert\exp(f_i/\eta)\). The effective1556coarse payoff includes a shift of \(\eta\log\lvert1557q^{-1}(i)\rvert\), which cancels from the response when1558the fiber sizes agree. More generally, using positive1559reference weights \(w_j\) on \(S'\) makes the mass of a fiber1560proportional to