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evolutionary-game-theory-in-higher-categories.tex

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1441limit in the maximizing inequalities for \(y_n\in B(x_n)\)1442shows that any limit \(y\) maximizes against the limit \(x\).1443Compactness of the simplex then gives upper semicontinuity.1444One may extend the correspondence to the ambient Euclidean1445space by precomposing \(B\) with the nearest-point projection1446onto the simplex. The standard existence theorem for locally1447bounded upper semicontinuous differential inclusions with1448nonempty compact convex values supplies a local solution1449\cite{aubin-cellina}.1450 1451For a solution, \(b(t)=\dot x(t)+x(t)\) belongs to the1452simplex almost everywhere. The integrating factor gives1453\[1454 x(t)=e^{-t} x(0)+\int_0^t e^{-(t-s)}b(s)\,ds .1455\]1456The coefficients form a probability weighting. This keeps1457the path in the simplex and hence within the region where1458the original correspondence is defined. The velocity is1459bounded there, so the path extends to every forward time1460by continuation. Existence requires no choice of best1461response at a tie. There may be several paths from the same1462initial state. A point admits a constant path exactly when1463\(x\in B(x)\), the Nash condition. Convergence results for1464this inclusion require substantial further structure.1465For instance, Hofbauer and Sorin study continuous1466concave--convex zero-sum games and identify convergence1467to the saddle-point set \cite{hofbauer-sorin}.1468 1469\section{Pairwise comparison}1470 1471Suppose a reviser currently using \(j\) switches towards1472\(i\) at rate \(\rho(F_i(x)-F_j(x))\), absorbing any common1473uniform sampling frequency into time. Let \(\rho\) be1474nonnegative and locally Lipschitz, strictly positive for1475positive arguments and zero for nonpositive arguments.1476The drift of \(x_i\) is the difference between incoming1477and outgoing flux:1478\begin{equation}1479 W_i(x)=\sum_j x_j\rho(F_i(x)-F_j(x))1480     -x_i\sum_j\rho(F_j(x)-F_i(x)).1481 \label{eq:pairwise-drift}1482\end{equation}1483Each individual transfer contributes with opposite signs1484to the two relevant coordinates. Summing therefore gives1485zero, and the rate at an absent coordinate is nonnegative.1486If \(F\) is locally Lipschitz, the incoming-term variation1487argument of Chapter~\ref{ch:replicator} shows that the1488resulting equation has a unique global forward trajectory1489from each simplex state.1490 1491\begin{proposition}[Rest states under comparison]1492A state is a rest point of \eqref{eq:pairwise-drift}1493if and only if it is Nash.1494\end{proposition}1495 1496\begin{proof}1497Reindexing the sum of the outgoing terms gives1498\[1499 F(x)\cdot W(x)=1500 \sum_{i,j} x_j\rho(F_i(x)-F_j(x))1501                  (F_i(x)-F_j(x))\ge0.1502\]1503Every summand is nonnegative, and it is positive1504exactly when \(x_j>0\) and \(F_i(x)>F_j(x)\).1505At a rest point no such pair exists. Thus every used1506strategy maximizes payoff, so \(x\in B(x)\).1507Conversely, if \(x\in B(x)\), every transition away1508from a used strategy has rate zero. Both flux terms1509vanish.1510\end{proof}1511 1512This is the positive-correlation argument for pairwise1513comparison dynamics \cite{sandholm-pairwise}. It also yields1514a strict increase of the potential along nonstationary1515paths when the payoff one-form is exact. In a related1516protocol, sample the candidate from the current population1517and use \([F_i-F_j]_+=\max(F_i-F_j,0)\) as the switch1518rate conditional on the candidate. The flux from \(j\) to1519\(i\) is then \(x_j x_i[F_i-F_j]_+\).1520Combining it with its reverse flux and using1521\([a]_+-[-a]_+=a\) recovers \eqref{eq:replicator}.1522This latter sampling convention cannot create an absent1523type. The state-independent availability of candidates is1524the hypothesis that makes the preceding characterization1525include the boundary Nash inequalities.1526 1527\section{Logit revision and regularization}1528 1529Fix a noise parameter \(\eta>0\). The logit response is1530\[1531 B^\eta_i(x)=\frac{\exp(F_i(x)/\eta)}1532                   {\sum_j\exp(F_j(x)/\eta)} .1533\]1534The smooth response map from fitness vectors to probabilities1535preserves common payoff baselines and is equivariant under1536strategy relabeling. For a bijection \(S\to S'\) with1537permutation map \(P\) the latter statement is1538\[1539\begin{tikzcd}[column sep=large]1540\mathbb R^S \arrow[r,"\operatorname{softmax}_{\eta}"]\arrow[d] &