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evolutionary-game-theory-in-higher-categories.tex

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1249its entropy derivative would be strictly negative.1250The trajectory has bounded speed on the closed ball.1251It would therefore spend intervals of a fixed positive1252duration where the derivative is bounded above by a1253negative constant, on arbitrarily late visits near \(z\).1254Taking disjoint visits contradicts convergence of the1255entropy values. The limit points are consequently all \(p\).1256The trajectory lies in a compact set and hence converges1257to \(p\).1258\end{proof}1259 1260The same argument supplies a global conclusion on \(U_p\)1261if \(p\) is a Nash state and1262\[1263 (x-p)\cdot\bigl(F(x)-F(p)\bigr)<01264 \qquad(x\ne p)1265\]1266on the whole simplex. The Nash inequality implies1267\((x-p)\cdot F(x)<0\). A finite sublevel set of1268\(D(p\Vert-)\) stays away from zeros of the required1269coordinates, so the compact-set argument applies there.1270For completeness, each term with \(p_i>0\) is bounded below1271by \(p_i\log p_i\), while the term for \(x_i\) tends to1272infinity at \(x_i=0\). This gives positive lower bounds1273for the required coordinates on any one sublevel set.1274This strict inequality is a special sufficient condition.1275Hofbauer and Sandholm establish broader geometric criteria1276for convergence in stable population games1277\cite{hofbauer-sandholm-stable}.1278 1279\section{Selection as a metric gradient}1280 1281At an interior state \(x\), tangent vectors are vectors \(u\)1282with \(\sum_i u_i=0\). The Shahshahani metric is1283\[1284 g_x(u,v)=\sum_i\frac{u_i v_i}{x_i}.1285\]1286The same definition applies to the relative interior of1287each face by restricting the coordinates to its support1288\cite{shahshahani,hofbauer-sigmund}. Define the fitness1289one-form on a face by \(\alpha_x(u)=\sum_iF_i(x)u_i\).1290If \(R_F\) denotes the replicator vector field, its1291metric pairing with \(u\) is1292\[1293 g_x(R_F(x),u)=\sum_i(F_i(x)-\phi(x))u_i=\alpha_x(u).1294\]1295The field is the metric dual of the payoff one-form.1296Adding a state-dependent baseline to all payoffs leaves1297the one-form unchanged, because all tangent vectors1298have zero sum.1299 1300Pointwise, every tangent covector has a representative1301in the ambient strategy coordinates, and two such1302representatives differ by a multiple of \(\mathbf 1\).1303Writing \(X\) for the relative interior of the full simplex,1304the fitness, one-form, and field correspond by1305\[1306\begin{tikzcd}[column sep=huge]1307\mathbb R^S/\mathbb R\mathbf 11308 \arrow[r,"{[f]\mapsto f\cdot(-)}"] \arrow[dr,"R_x"']1309 & T_x^*X \arrow[d,"g_x^{-1}"] \\1310 & T_xX .1311\end{tikzcd}1312\]1313Here \(R_x\) denotes the linear map that projects a fitness1314vector by its resident mean and multiplies by the current1315frequencies. At a proper face the corresponding metric1316duality uses only supported coordinates. All payoff1317coordinates outside the support then disappear from1318the tangent covector, even though they are needed to1319evaluate invasion by absent types.1320 1321If \(\alpha=dV\) for a differentiable potential \(V\), this1322duality says that \(R_F\) is the Riemannian gradient of \(V\).1323The rate of increase of the potential is1324\begin{equation}1325 \frac{d}{dt}V(x(t))=g_x(R_F,R_F)1326     =\sum_i x_i(F_i(x)-\phi(x))^2 .1327 \label{eq:potential-rate}1328\end{equation}1329Only supported coordinates enter this identity. For a1330potential continuously differentiable on the closed1331simplex in its affine hull, the right side extends1332continuously to every face. Compactness bounds the1333potential and the speed of the trajectory. As in the1334entropy argument, a nonrest limit point would give1335repeated fixed-duration intervals of strictly positive1336increase, which is impossible. This shows that each1337limit point is a rest point. It leaves convergence to a1338particular rest point open when the rest set has several1339possible limit points.1340 1341For matrix payoffs, write \(A=S+K\) with \(S\) symmetric1342and \(K\) skew-symmetric. When \(K=0\), one can take1343\(V(x)=x^{\mathsf T}Sx/2\). More generally \(A\) defines a1344potential on the interior precisely when the bilinear form1345\(u^{\mathsf T}Av\) is symmetric on tangent vectors.1346Indeed, the exterior derivative of the payoff one-form1347on constant tangent vectors is1348\(v^{\mathsf T}Au-u^{\mathsf T}Av\). This must vanish