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evolutionary-game-theory-in-higher-categories.tex

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81\DeclareMathOperator{\Nat}{Nat}82\newcommand{\Set}{\mathbf{Set}}83\newcommand{\FinSet}{\mathbf{FinSet}}84\newcommand{\Cat}{\mathcal{C}}85 86\setcounter{tocdepth}{1}87\DeclareMathOperator{\tr}{tr}88\DeclareMathOperator{\Tr}{Tr}89\DeclareMathOperator{\Ad}{Ad}90\DeclareMathOperator{\Map}{Map}91\DeclareMathOperator{\Tor}{Tor}92\DeclareMathOperator{\Ext}{Ext}93\DeclareMathOperator{\Rep}{Rep}94\DeclareMathOperator{\End}{End}95 96\newcommand{\hrepPart}{}97\newcommand{\bookpart}[2]{%98  \addtocontents{toc}{\protect\hrepPartEntry{#1}{#2}}%99  \gdef\hrepPart{{\sffamily\small\color{bookaccent}Part #1\enspace #2\par\vspace{12pt}}}}100\newcommand{\hrepPartEntry}[2]{%101  \Needspace{6\baselineskip}%102  \par\addvspace{0.7\baselineskip}%103  \noindent\textcolor{bookaccent}{\textbf{#1\enspace #2}}\par\nopagebreak[4]}104\titleformat{\chapter}[display]105  {\normalfont\huge\bfseries\raggedright}106  {\hrepPart\sffamily\small\bfseries\color{bookaccent}\MakeUppercase{\chaptertitlename}\ \thechapter}107  {8pt}{}108  [\global\let\hrepPart\empty\vspace{4pt}{\color{bookrule}\titlerule}]109 110\begin{document}111\frontmatter112\begin{titlepage}113  \thispagestyle{empty}114  \vspace*{0.16\textheight}115  {\noindent\color{bookaccent}\rule{\textwidth}{1pt}\par}116  \vspace{17pt}117  {\fontsize{27}{34}\selectfont\bfseries\raggedright118   Evolutionary Game Theory\\in Higher Categories\par}119  \vspace{14pt}120  {\noindent\Large Stability, stochastic selection,\\and compositional models\par}121  \vspace{30pt}122  {\noindent\large Anonymous\par}123  \vfill124  {\noindent\small November 2026\par}125\end{titlepage}126 127\tableofcontents128\mainmatter129 130\bookpart{I}{Fitness, invasion, and stability}131\chapter{Population states and payoff maps}132\label{ch:population}133 134Evolutionary game theory uses a payoff comparison to describe how the135composition of a population changes the prospects of its members. The136state of a population is a distribution of strategic types. The same137set of types can support many different models, since changing the138matching process or the rule for converting payoffs to growth can139change the resulting dynamics. This chapter isolates the distribution140and payoff operations used in the pairwise, randomly matched model141\cite[Chs.~1--2]{alexander}.142 143\section{Distributions and relabeling}144 145For a nonempty finite set \(I\) of types, the population state space is146the simplex147\[148 \Delta(I)=\left\{x\in\mathbb R^I:149          x_i\geq0,\quad \sum_{i\in I}x_i=1\right\}.150\]151Write \(\delta_i\) for the state concentrated on \(i\).152The support of \(x\) is the set of its positive coordinates.153For a nonempty subset \(S\subseteq I\), the inclusion154\(\Delta(S)\to\Delta(I)\) inserts zero in the omitted coordinates.155Its image is a face, and its relative interior consists precisely156of the states of support \(S\). The affine hull of the full simplex157is the hyperplane \(\sum_i x_i=1\), whose translation space is158\(T_I=\{v:\sum_i v_i=0\}\). Feasible directions at a boundary state159are those \(v\in T_I\) with \(v_i\geq0\) whenever \(x_i=0\).160Indeed, this is necessary for \(x+t v\) to have nonnegative161coordinates at positive \(t\). It is sufficient for small \(t\)162because only finitely many of the positive coordinates can decrease.163 164A map of type sets \(f:I\to J\) pushes a distribution forward by165\[166 (f_*x)_j=\sum_{f(i)=j}x_i.167\]168Its linear extension uses the same formula on all vectors.169If \(g:J\to K\), collecting the terms in the sums indexed by each170fiber of \(g f\) gives \((gf)_*=g_*f_*\). The identity map gives171the identity on distributions. Thus simplex formation is a functor172from finite sets to convex sets and affine maps. It extends on all173sets to \(\mathsf D I\), the set of finitely supported probability174distributions. A map on Dirac states extends uniquely to an affine175map out of \(\mathsf D I\), since every element is a finite176combination \(\sum_i x_i\delta_i\) and its coefficient function177is uniquely determined by \(x\). Accordingly a stochastic178assignment of an output distribution to each type is determined179by its values on types and then acts affinely on populations.180