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1%% Evolutionary Game Theory in Machine Learning and AI: Naturality, Regret, and Recurrence2%% Higher Categorical Semantics. Byline: Anonymous.3%% Single-file LaTeX source (UTF-8), version 1.0, 17 November 2026. Two-column article.4%% Build: pdflatex (three passes). 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We organize these identifications around one structure. A learner is an open72dynamical system with payoffs as input and a mixed strategy as output; a game is a wiring of learners; and a73learning rule is \emph{natural} if its closed-loop dynamics commutes with payoff-preserving maps of games, in74particular with the duplication of actions. Each qualitative statement is paired with a quantitative one.75Naturality: the replicator learner is natural, while softmax policy gradient, entropy regularization, score76averaging and a mutation-chain ranking are not, with computed defects; duplicating an action $k$ times multiplies77the policy-gradient learning time by exactly $2k/(k+1)$. Regret: at most $\ln n$ in continuous time for every78horizon, against $\sqrt{T\ln n/2}$ in discrete time. Recurrence: in zero-sum games the relative entropy to79equilibrium is conserved by the flow, increases by exactly $\log\E e^{\eta f}\approx\eta^2\Var(f)/2$ per step80of multiplicative weights, and decays at rate at least $\alpha$ under entropy-regularized dynamics. Finite81populations of learners obey the one-third law and the amplifier and suppressor phenomena of evolutionary graph82theory. All numerical statements are recomputed by a companion script with 21 checks. No new theorem of83learning theory is claimed; the contribution is the organization, the exact constants, and the naturality84criterion.85\end{minipage}\end{center}86\vspace{1.2em}87]88 89\section{Introduction}90 91Evolutionary game theory studies populations in which strategies that earn more become more common. Its92central object, the replicator equation93\begin{equation}\label{eq:rep}94\dot x_i=x_i\bigl((Ax)_i-x^{\T}Ax\bigr),95\end{equation}96was written down for animal conflicts \cite{TaJo78,MSP73}. Machine learning arrived at the same equation97several times: as the continuous-time limit of reinforcement learning \cite{BoSa97} and of multiplicative98weights \cite{FrSc97,Sor09}, as natural policy gradient on a softmax policy \cite{Kak01}, and implicitly in99population-based training, where agents copy their betters \cite{Jad17}. A compact account of the evolutionary side, written100for philosophers and candid about the fragility of the models, is Alexander's Element \cite{Alex23}; a